As the United States entered the Vietnam War in the mid-1960s, the search for international allies became paramount. In May 1964, the U.S. launched the ‘more flags’ campaign, attempting to rally support from allied nations. The aim was not only to bolster military efforts on the battlefield but also to frame the conflict within the larger narrative of the Cold War, counteracting accusations of American colonialism.
President Lyndon Johnson’s approach was heavily symbolic. He famously suggested, in a conversation with British Prime Minister Harold Wilson, that even a mere ‘platoon of bagpipers’ would suffice, so long as British presence was felt through their flag.
Initially, American leaders perceived the ‘more flags’ initiative primarily as a means to secure financial aid, military advisors, and humanitarian support from nations identified as part of the free world. However, following the deployment of the first American combat troops in March 1965, the United States shifted its expectations. It sought tangible military contributions that mirrored its own engagement in Vietnam, specifically looking for allied forces to join the fight.
As the U.S. found success in the Asia-Pacific region, it also turned its attention to Latin America, confident that historical precedents from World War I and World War II would yield similar results. Brazil, for instance, had participated significantly in both wars, and Colombia had contributed troops in the Korean War. However, as the United States sought military support from its southern neighbors, enthusiasm quickly waned.
Reports indicated that most Latin American leaders, including those in Argentina and Venezuela, were reluctant to take the political risks associated with sending troops to Vietnam. U.S. ambassadors advised against even broaching the subject with these countries. Just as prospects seemed bleak, attention increasingly shifted to Brazil.
By early 1965, U.S.-Brazil relations were strengthening. The military coup that brought Humberto Castelo Branco to power marked a shift in Brazil’s foreign policy towards closer alignment with the United States. This sentiment was echoed by Brazil’s Ambassador to Washington, who proclaimed, ‘What is good for the United States is good for Brazil.’
Tangible military cooperation followed shortly. In the spring of 1965, Brazil deployed over 1,300 troops to aid the U.S.-led intervention in the Dominican Republic, setting a precedent that American officials hoped would pave the way for Brazilian involvement in Vietnam.
By December 1965, U.S. officials began to discuss the possibility of linking a $150 million economic loan to Brazil with a request for military support in Vietnam. National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy advocated for this strategy, viewing Castelo Branco as amenable to such an implicit agreement. During a meeting in the Oval Office, Bundy emphasized that while they did not intend to blackmail the Brazilian leader, they needed to convey the urgency of securing a Brazilian military commitment.
Johnson ultimately consented to Bundy’s plan, though he made it clear he wanted to explore every avenue to persuade Brazil without creating a strict conditionality that might backfire.
U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon soon took action, asking Castelo Branco about the prospects for sending a battalion to Vietnam. The Brazilian president was hesitant, citing the requirement for Congressional approval and highlighting the unconstitutionality of acting without legislative support. He argued that Brazil’s existing troop contributions in the Dominican Republic constituted a significant sacrifice and implied that it should suffice by alleviating pressure on U.S. forces in Southeast Asia.
Despite Castelo Branco’s initial reluctance, he agreed to further consider Gordon’s request, but ultimately, no immediate commitment was made, and the economic loan was released without a firm answer regarding military support.
As 1966 unfolded, a growing sentiment emerged among some Brazilian officials that contributing troops to Vietnam could provide valuable insights into counter-revolutionary warfare. The lessons learned from such an experience could potentially inform Brazil’s handling of domestic insurgencies. Consequently, the Brazilian Minister of War sought to send military attaches to Vietnam to garner intelligence and operational experience.
The most substantial proposal came from Manoel Pio Corrêa, the Secretary General of Brazil’s Foreign Ministry. During a lunch with U.S. Ambassador John Tuthill and naval officers from both nations on December 30, 1966, Corrêa expressed concerns over the inadequacy of Brazil’s naval capabilities. His assertion that a decline in Brazil’s military stature could threaten domestic stability prompted him to propose a request for two modern destroyers under a lend-lease program.
In return, Pio Corrêa offered to commit Brazilian forces to the Vietnam War. He outlined an audacious plan where Brazil could acquire the destroyers in Honolulu and participate in naval operations in the vicinity of Vietnam. Following this proposed ‘shakedown cruise,’ the Brazilian navy would ostensibly provoke North Vietnam to engage them in combat, allowing Brazil a formal entry into the war.
Tuthill left the meeting optimistic that the U.S. had a viable opportunity to secure Brazilian naval support for the conflict.
However, despite initial enthusiasm, Brazilian boot prints were notably absent from the forests of Vietnam. Public opinion began to weigh heavily on Brazil’s leadership, as protests against the war erupted throughout the nation. Concerns over backlash from the Brazilian populace played a significant role in the government’s decision-making process, with leaders like General Artur da Costa e Silva, who succeeded Castelo Branco, exhibiting a keen awareness of domestic sentiment.
Nationalism within Brazil added further complications to the potential commitment. Brazilian leaders were wary that sending troops to Vietnam could tarnish their image, positioning their soldiers as mercenaries in U.S. conflicts. This concern grew, especially as abstaining from direct involvement began to serve domestic political goals.
On the U.S. side, the State Department’s skepticism regarding Pio Corrêa’s proposal highlighted the intricacies of U.S.-Brazil negotiations. The department preferred clarity in commitments and sought to establish firm conditions for any potential Brazilian troop deployment.
Ultimately, as momentum shifted and various internal and external factors began to clash, it became increasingly clear that deploying Brazilian troops to Vietnam would pose significant challenges for both nations.
Looking back as we mark the events surrounding the 50th anniversary of the fall of Saigon, one must ponder whether a contingent of Latin American soldiers could have altered the trajectory of the Vietnam War. The consensus, in hindsight, leans toward no.
The exploration of Brazil’s involvement reveals much about international relations and the delicate interplay between military alliances and domestic politics. It brings to light the considerable distance between strategic needs and the willingness of partner nations to step into the fray. More importantly, it serves as a poignant reminder of the influence of public sentiment in dictating the actions of even the most stable dictatorships.
In sum, Latin American reluctance to join the Vietnam fight ultimately safeguarded national interests and perhaps prevented an even greater calamity. As U.S. Ambassador Lincoln Gordon later stated regarding the initiative to enlist Latin American help, ‘It would have been a disaster.’
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