FAIRBANKS, Alaska — In June, Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska became a focal point for advanced military exercises as dozens of aircraft lined the flight line for the renowned Red Flag. This multinational event serves as an opportunity for the U.S. and its allies to exhibit tactical air combat capabilities and prepare military units for potential wartime operations.
However, just 20 miles northwest of Eielson, a parallel and inconspicuous testing phase was taking place beyond the Army’s Fort Wainwright. The Defense Innovation Unit (DIU), the Pentagon’s hub for commercial technology, orchestrated a series of trials involving small, long-range attack drones. These drones were specifically designed to navigate and strike targets amid electronic warfare efforts that aimed to jam their signals.
This testing segment, though smaller than the prominent Red Flag exercise, spotlighted critical themes that could significantly impact the future of aerial warfare. These include the evolving role of drones in modern combat and the effectiveness of the Pentagon’s attempts to stimulate the growth of the domestic industrial base. Additionally, reforming internal bureaucratic processes aimed at acquiring these systems in substantial quantities was central to these efforts.
The focus on autonomous systems has been a recurrent theme in military discussions, with the battlefield in Ukraine underscoring the effectiveness of drones in warfare. Recently, under the administration of President Donald Trump, there has been a push for investment into the commercial drone sector, alongside efforts to alleviate some policy barriers that hinder the procurement, testing, and deployment of such technologies.
In a memo dated July 10, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced expansive reforms concerning how military services acquire small, uncrewed air systems. This directive granted ground troops greater authority to directly test and purchase these systems.
While these reformative steps from the White House highlight a stronger commitment, it remains uncertain whether efforts to boost domestically produced drones will yield meaningful results. Previous attempts to overhaul the Department of Defense (DOD) acquisition processes and shift military priorities have often faltered, casting doubt on the potential success of the latest initiatives.
Observing the DIU testing in Alaska provided a glimpse into the current state of the military’s acquisition framework and the drone industry’s preparedness to meet urgent needs. Trent Emeneker, a leader in several autonomy projects for DIU, emphasized a worrying trend: the U.S. military’s capabilities in aerial drone technology are lagging behind those of global competitors.
“There is so much that we need to do right now in the uncrewed systems space,” Emeneker stated in an interview with reporters. “We are just really far behind, and we have to catch up.”
The testing was conducted over four days and was part of a DIU initiative named Artemis, aimed at identifying and purchasing low-cost commercial Uncrewed Aerial Systems (UAS) that can effectively fly long distances, strike targets, and operate under electronic warfare conditions like signal jamming and spoofing.
During the trials in Alaska, DIU officials aimed to assess whether the Artemis drones could effectively acquire and maintain their targets while under the disruption of jamming. The project involved contracts with four companies: AV (previously AeroVironment), Dragoon, and two unnamed Ukrainian firms, each partnered with U.S.-based software entities, one with Swan and the other with Auterion.
Only AV and Dragoon participated in the live testing event at Eielson. The Ukrainian companies were engaged in operations within their home country and had not yet disclosed their drones for testing due to security concerns. One of the Ukrainian firms had already met its contractual testing requirements. However, the other firm faced significant setbacks after being targeted in a Russian attack that decimated its production capabilities.
AV showcased a prototype tailored specifically for the Artemis project, utilizing an experimental software base. This drone is designed for one-way attack missions and incorporates a navigation system that operates independently from satellite signals like GPS.
Dragoon presented its entry for Artemis, a vertical takeoff-and-landing drone known as Sender, which was initially developed under a small contract with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The design focused on striking a balance between affordability, flexibility, and the ability to undertake long-duration missions.
The Artemis project was initiated in response to a supplemental spending package for Ukraine approved by Congress, which allocated approximately $16 million to the DOD for the rapid identification of drone solutions. Within just seven months, DIU was able to solicit proposals, assess them, and contract four companies to build prototypes—an expedited timeline compared to traditional DOD acquisition programs.
A crucial aspect of DIU’s strategy is its collaboration with acquisition offices within military branches and combatant commands, aiming to purchase and deploy validated commercial capabilities. Without an acquisition partner, initiatives can stagnate, often falling victim to the notorious “valley of death,” which describes the challenging phase between a project’s inception and its acceptance by end users.
Despite the Pentagon’s emphasis on enhancing its arsenal of uncrewed systems, DIU has faced hurdles in securing an acquisition partner for the Artemis project. Emeneker and his team have endeavored to engage with various program offices since the project’s inception but have not achieved the desired collaboration. There remains hesitancy among services to invest in a system that does not meet their unique specifications or requirements.
“We continue to make phone calls every day and talk to program offices, talk to people who are interested that theoretically have money. I don’t have a great answer. We don’t have a partner,” Emeneker noted in the context of his frustrations.
The expectations surrounding the drone systems’ performance during testing were high, and the initial results were disappointing. During the second day of testing, AV’s drone struggled to locate its target amid jamming and ultimately crashed, while Dragoon’s drone flew past its intended mark, igniting upon impact.
Neither drone showcased the effectiveness DIU had anticipated under electronic warfare conditions.
Emeneker acknowledged that it was premature to label the project a failure but expressed concern over the unanticipated performance issues.
“Without looking at the data and analyzing it, it’s really hard to know because understanding the interplay of the jamming… software bugs, it gets complex,” he stated, adding, “it was not what I would have hoped for or wanted to see.”
While acknowledging the tested systems were not flawless, Emeneker clarified that the ultimate goal of Artemis is to establish a baseline for affordable drone capabilities that can serve as alternatives to expensive military munitions. By the end of the testing phase, the drones had made contact with targets but still fell short of accuracy in hitting them directly.
Emeneker remains apprehensive about what the preliminary assessment suggests regarding the U.S. drone industrial base’s readiness.
“If we had to go to war tomorrow, do we have what we need? No. So, how do we fix that? That’s what we’re trying to do is fix that capability,” he posed.
DIU has been working persistently to tackle the challenges plaguing the U.S. drone industrial sector over recent years. In 2020, it launched the Blue UAS project to streamline the procurement of small drones for field units.
Chris Bonzagni, a former DIU program manager now overseeing his consulting firm, was involved in establishing Blue UAS, which aims to ensure that commercial drones align with U.S. regulations that prohibit the military from acquiring uncrewed systems with critical components sourced from China.
Bonzagni, who was on-site to support the Artemis testing, emphasized that Blue was crafted with field personnel in mind.
“The vision for Blue UAS was, we’re all infantry guys; I’m a former enlisted guy. How do I get a list of drones that, if I’m a staff sergeant in Iraq at the time, they can just purchase with their [government purchase card],” he reflected on the original intent behind the project.
Although Blue UAS has since become the benchmark for drone compliance validation across the U.S. government, Bonzagni sees the initiative as a largely ineffective attempt to provide low-cost drones to troops in urgent need.
Funding shortages and a convoluted DOD acquisition framework have restricted the program’s ability to scale, and policies requiring companies to demonstrate compliance with each hardware and software update stymied innovation.
As Ukrainian forces deployed thousands of drones to fortify their resistance against Russian aggression, the U.S. struggled to deliver sufficient systems to its own operatives.
DIU is actively pursuing solutions to these hurdles with plans to broaden the array of cleared companies within its Blue UAS initiative.
Hegseth’s recent memo on “drone dominance” directs the Defense Contract Management Agency to assist in scaling these efforts, which may lead to increased resources for the project and the reduction of policy barriers that have inhibited progress.
Emeneker asserted that through initiatives like Blue UAS and Artemis, DIU aims to refocus the Pentagon’s acquisition process on the needs of frontline tactical units.
Another new initiative dubbed Project GI intends to put “ready-now” drones through rigorous operational testing, which is vital for ensuring these systems function as intended in real-world settings.
“That’s who we want to focus on. It’s not a lab. It’s not the colonel. It’s not the sergeant first class. It’s the people on the front line,” Emeneker concluded, noting an ongoing effort to shift the acquisition paradigm back toward end users.
image source from：defensenews
