The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) held contentious hearings over three days last week to interrogate officials from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the Army regarding the events leading up to a tragic collision between a Black Hawk helicopter and a passenger jet over Washington, D.C., which resulted in the deaths of 67 people.
The hearings disclosed alarming details, including the revelation that the helicopter’s altimeter gauge was malfunctioning, and before the incident, controllers had warned the FAA about the potential hazards posed by helicopters in busy airspaces.
NTSB Chairwoman Jennifer Homendy did not hold back her criticism of the FAA during the hearings, questioning their inaction in the wake of these fatal warnings. “Are you kidding me? Sixty-seven people are dead! How do you explain that? Our bureaucratic process?” she asked emphatically. “Fix it. Do better.”
Among the victims of the January crash were a group of prestigious young figure skaters, along with their coaches and parents, as well as four union steamfitters from the Washington area.
Significant findings from the hearings included a crucial problem with the helicopter’s altimeter, which was reading inaccurately low—between 80 to 100 feet lower than the height indicated by the flight data recorder. At the time of the collision, the helicopter was flying at an altitude of 278 feet (85 meters), well above the designated ceiling of 200 feet (61 meters) for that route.
Investigation points revealed that the faulty altimeter might have misled the pilots regarding their height, contributing to the disaster. Furthermore, investigators identified similar discrepancies with the altimeters from three other helicopters from the same unit. An expert from Sikorsky, the manufacturer of Black Hawk helicopters, explained that the model involved in the crash was outdated and lacked advanced air data computers, resulting in its less reliable altitude readings.
Army Chief Warrant Officer Kylene Lewis stated during the hearings that such discrepancies in altitude readings would not usually raise alarm among pilots. She noted that, under normal conditions, Army pilots are trained to rely on radar altimeters at lower altitudes and usually maintain a strict altitude margin of 100 feet (30 meters).
However, Rick Dressler from Metro Aviation raised concerns about the lack of precision in altitude readings, emphasizing that for other helicopters, altitudes are treated as hard limits, particularly on routes like the one flown by the Black Hawk.
As the hearings progressed, both the FAA and Army officials attempted to deflect responsibility for the crash. The testimony brought forth various actions that might have prevented the tragedy, though the NTSB’s final report, expected next year, may not identify a singular cause.
Aviation safety consultant and former crash investigator Jeff Guzzetti remarked, “I think it was a week of reckoning for the FAA and the U.S. Army in this accident.”
Army officials expressed concerns regarding the FAA’s approval of landing routes at Ronald Reagan International Airport, which allow for minimal separation distances— as little as 75 feet (23 meters) —between landing planes and helicopters.
Scott Rosengren, chief engineer responsible for Army utility helicopters, voiced his worries, stating, “The fact that we have less than 500-foot separation is a concern for me.”
Additionally, Army Chief Warrant Officer David Van Vechten noted his surprise that air traffic controllers permitted the helicopter to proceed while the airliner was making its descent to land. He conveyed that he was never given clearance to operate beneath a landing plane during his numerous flights along that path. Moreover, several pilots from the unit mentioned it was routine to be instructed to fly under descending aircraft, believing it was safe as long as they adhered to approved flight routes.
Frank McIntosh, who heads the FAA’s air traffic control organization, reflected on the reliance of controllers on visual separation to manage the busy air traffic at Reagan. He noted that controllers often used “squeeze plays” to land planes with minimal separation to keep air traffic flowing.
The night of the crash, controllers asked the helicopter crew if they had the jet in sight, to which they replied affirmatively and requested approval for visual separation. However, discussions in the hearing raised serious doubts about whether the helicopter pilots could accurately visualize the jet, especially while wearing night vision goggles.
Testimony also revealed that the controllers never warned the airliner about the helicopter being on a collision course, although they believed such a caution would not have made a difference at such a late stage. The plane was in a descent to land when it received a warning in the cockpit moments before the collision, but unfortunately, it was too late to avoid the impact.
The hearings shed light on previous warnings received by the FAA concerning the dangers posed by helicopter operations in Washington, D.C. An FAA working group sought to include a cautionary note on helicopter charts back in 2022, advising pilots to exercise caution whenever the secondary runway was utilized. However, the FAA rejected the suggestion, despite the working group’s assessment that helicopter operations were occurring in close proximity to one another, resulting in several alarming safety events that were exhibiting a troubling upward trend.
In parallel, discussions to relocate the helicopter routes were initiated but ultimately went nowhere. A manager at a nearby regional radar facility had previously urged the FAA in writing to reduce the volume of takeoffs and landings at Reagan due to safety worries.
Furthermore, the NTSB revealed the FAA’s failure to acknowledge a concerning history of 85 near-misses reported around Reagan in the three years prior to the collision. NTSB Chairwoman Homendy remarked, “Every sign was there that there was a safety risk and the tower was telling you that.” She expressed dismay that, rather than addressing the warnings, the FAA opted to transfer managers out of the airport after the accident.
“What you did is you transferred people out instead of taking ownership over the fact that everybody in FAA in the tower was saying there was a problem,” Homendy stated. “But you guys are pointing out, ‘Welp, our bureaucratic process. Somebody should have brought it up at some other symposium.'”
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