In the mid-2010s, Pentagon officials in the United States began to express significant concern regarding the rapid military advancements made by China and Russia.
Both nations were heavily investing in critical domains such as cyber capabilities, space, electronic warfare, and precision-guided munitions, alongside the development of long-range ground-based weapon systems.
U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work was particularly focused on China, asserting that the nation aimed to achieve military parity with the United States in terms of technological capability.
A notable development was the DF-21D, an anti-ship ballistic missile boasting a range nearing 1,000 miles, often referred to as the “carrier killer,” which posed a considerable threat to U.S. Navy ships, including aircraft carriers, in the Pacific region.
Recognizing this emerging threat, Work and his colleagues at the Pentagon concluded it was imperative to rethink potential conflict scenarios in the Pacific and strategize how the United States could emerge victorious in such circumstances.
Drawing inspiration from the historical offset strategies created during the Cold War to counteract Soviet advantages, Work proposed a “third offset” aimed at countering China’s strengths in the Pacific.
This initiative led the U.S. military to begin drafting innovative warfighting concepts, such as the navy’s Distributed Maritime Operations, which emphasized the dispersal of forces across vast areas while developing long-range weaponry.
Moreover, the Pentagon prioritized identifying necessary weapons, systems, and equipment to secure a strategic advantage, resulting in new investments across allied domains, including advanced sensors and space capabilities, and the exploration of technologies like advanced sea mines.
Work characterized this third offset as an integration of technology, operational concepts, and new organizational structures—essentially rethinking the organization of military forces to sustain the U.S. capability to project combat power at optimized times and locations.
However, the strategy garnered mixed responses.
Despite the upcoming urgency expressed by defense officials, the third offset lacked coherent execution or sense of immediacy, particularly as the United States maintained its position as the leading global superpower, with neither China nor Russia possessing a substantial military advantage.
Fast forward to today, the landscape has transformed dramatically.
China’s defense industrial base has transitioned to a wartime schedule, producing military hardware and software at an unprecedented tempo, a situation described by Admiral Samuel Paparo, the head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, as “alarming.”
With a military and commercial shipbuilding capacity roughly 230 times greater than that of the United States, China’s long-range missile capabilities have also rapidly expanded over the last two decades.
This burgeoning military prowess presents a serious obstacle for the U.S. military, particularly within the two concentric island chains flanking China’s maritime borders.
The second of these island chains stretches from Japan to Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, and Palau, a geographic area where U.S. forces could be significantly vulnerable should hostilities over Taiwan escalate into a full-scale conflict.
Similar to the Soviet Union’s vulnerabilities during the Cold War, China too has weaknesses that the United States can leverage.
With the increased focus on Beijing in recent years, the Pentagon has yet to produce a modern version of the AirLand Battle concept established in the 1970s to confront the Soviet Union in central Europe.
While attention has been directed toward emerging technologies, including autonomous systems and artificial intelligence, it’s essential to acknowledge that technology alone does not secure victory in warfare.
As argued by Andrew Marshall, who led the Pentagon’s Office of Net Assessment for many years, “Technology makes possible the revolution, but the revolution itself takes place only when new concepts of operation develop.”
This implies that the United States requires a unified operational strategy—a clear plan for military engagements—and it must act decisively to make investments and procurements that sufficiently counter Beijing’s industrial and numerical advantages.
Failure to do so could result in the United States losing a conflict against China.
Historically, the U.S. has successfully offset adversarial advantages in past conflicts.
During the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration rolled out the New Look strategy, devised as a response to the Soviet Union’s significant numerical superiority.
In the 1950s, Soviet ground forces outnumbered U.S. and allied forces in Europe by nearly three to one while also building a formidable industrial base.
In response, rather than maintaining a large standing army in Europe—which could strain the U.S. economy—President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s strategy entailed developing a strong nuclear arsenal and formulating plans to employ tactical nuclear weapons against Soviet troops in the event of a conflict.
The United States aimed to inflict “massive retaliatory damage by offensive striking power,” as outlined in the administration’s policy document, NSC 162/2, authorized in October 1953.
The intent was not only to bolster deterrence but also to prepare for potential conflicts.
Backed by investments in nuclear weapons and long-range bombers, such as a significant increase in B-52 production, Eisenhower’s approach proved overwhelmingly effective.
By the 1960s, the U.S. had established a commanding lead in missiles, including nuclear missiles, which further deterred Soviet aggression in central Europe.
However, a decade later, U.S. defense cutbacks alongside Soviet advancements posed a risk of geopolitical imbalance.
Soviets achieved nuclear parity with the U.S. while holding a three-to-one conventional capability advantage in central Europe.
In response, the second offset was pioneered by U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, alongside Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, William Perry.
Recognizing that effective combat against Soviet forces required targeting rear-echelon units, this strategy led to an emphasis on the development of stealth and precision weapons, including the F-117 Nighthawk aircraft and laser-guided munitions.
These tactics were further pursued during the Reagan administration throughout the 1980s, causing concern in Moscow.
In 1981, a Soviet military exercise, Zapad-81, sought to evaluate how Soviet forces would respond to U.S. strategic initiatives, subsequently indicating that the military balance favored the NATO alliance over the Warsaw Pact.
Establishing a successful offset strategy hinges on two key steps: first, defining a detailed operational concept to defeat adversaries, and second, identifying and deploying the necessary capabilities that align with that operational concept.
When these steps are executed efficiently, it conveys a strong deterrence message to potential adversaries.
If the United States aims to thwart a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, detailed strategic considerations need to be assessed.
A conflict in such proximity to the Chinese mainland would prove highly challenging for the U.S. military due to China’s capacity to deploy an extensive arsenal of missiles, aircraft, and ships to the battlefield.
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would also face the daunting task of moving substantial numbers of troops through complex amphibious landings or air assaults.
Initial landing forces would be tasked with securing a foothold in Taiwan to facilitate the influx of follow-on PLA forces, underlining the urgency for the United States to act swiftly to prevent a territorial fait accompli within hours or days.
U.S. military operations must be designed to enable immediate strikes against the heart of any invading PLA forces to dislodge them from any occupied territory.
Consequently, a bolstered and expanded U.S. force posture in the region is vital to swift response to any Chinese invasion scenarios.
Potential measures could include the deployment of additional bombers to Australian bases, fortifying aircraft shelters at key locations such as Kadena Air Base in Japan, and organizational upgrades to protect missile installations in Guam.
Moreover, stockpiling critical supplies, including fuel and munitions across the Indo-Pacific, would ensure readiness for immediate conflict engagement.
The ability to conduct rapid strikes on PLA forces necessitates real-time visibility over high-value targets on the battlefield, requiring the capacity to effectively strike targets with mass and precision.
Key objectives include targeting PLA amphibious assault ships, helicopters, and airborne forces, alongside command-and-control centers that underpin the invading forces.
The United States must project combat power capable of operating both within and outside the scope of Chinese strike capabilities.
As articulated by Admiral Paparo, the objective should be to intensify operational challenges for the PLA in the Taiwan Strait, creating conditions that complicate their military objectives significantly.
Achieving this would necessitate substantial investments in precision-guided long-range missile inventories, particularly those designed to neutralize PLA surface vessels and aircraft.
Despite the high cost of such missiles, the United States currently lacks sufficient quantities to maintain a credible defense.
To remedy this, increasing research, manufacturing, and supply chain capabilities for affordable long-range missiles and a fleet of cost-effective unmanned systems that do not require runways for launch is essential.
While drones will play a vital role, traditional manned aircraft, particularly bombers and advanced fighters, will remain integral.
The stealth and operational range of aircraft like the B-21 Raider present significant challenges for China, as these bombers can maintain distances beyond China’s ballistic missile reach while deploying robust conventional and nuclear munitions.
Fifth and sixth-generation stealth aircraft, such as the F-35, also offer advantageous metrics, including rapid response capabilities and advanced sensor systems that can integrate battlefield data across joint forces.
Furthermore, incorporating nuclear-powered attack submarines into the strategy, as well as unmanned underwater systems, is critical since the PLA displays vulnerabilities in the maritime domain, specifically concerning tracking U.S. submarines.
Historical war games conducted by the Center for Strategic and International Studies have consistently highlighted U.S. submarines achieving success against PLA vessels.
It’s central for the United States to leverage this underwater superiority and prioritize operations within this domain to maintain an advantage over time.
In addition to these capabilities, harnessing next-generation artificial intelligence to efficiently analyze and disseminate data among military units is crucial for enhancing operational effectiveness.
However, the future of warfare is not solely defined by unmanned systems or advanced technologies.
U.S. military advantages must remain grounded in a robust operational strategy that does not rely merely on technological innovations.
Historical precedents, such as the British invention of the tank versus the tactical employment by German officers during World War II, underscore the importance of employing advanced technology effectively in combat situations.
Consequently, it is essential to identify and eliminate equipment that may not be relevant in a conflict with China, including the overreliance on surface ships and aircraft carriers, which pose significant vulnerabilities in offensive operations.
While considering future military allocations, the U.S. must balance its military preparedness along different fronts and ensure adequate readiness against other adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea.
However, the central focus must remain on effectively deterring and defeating Chinese aggression, drawing upon lessons learned during the Cold War to inform contemporary strategies.
image source from：foreignaffairs
