Legal scholars and lawmakers are grappling with a growing issue in the American judicial system: the increasing practice of federal district courts issuing nationwide injunctions.
These injunctions grant broad relief to plaintiffs, impacting not only the parties involved in a case but also third parties who are not represented or consulted, raising serious constitutional concerns.
The U.S. Constitution’s Article III vests “judicial power” in the Supreme Court and lower courts but does not explicitly define this power or encompass the ability to issue national injunctions.
The historical roots of such injunctions trace back to common law, where the nearest equivalent—a “bill of peace”—bound parties involved in a common dispute, yet did not resemble the expansive reach of modern-day nationwide injunctions.
Judicial power traditionally involves resolving disputes between the parties before a court and affording them appropriate relief, a principle that is increasingly overshadowed by the widespread issuance of national injunctions.
In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressed concerns regarding this burgeoning trend. Justice Thomas notably criticized nationwide injunctions in the case Trump v. Hawaii (2018), remarking, “If their popularity continues, this Court must address their legality.”
Despite this warning, data indicates a remarkable increase in the issuance of national injunctions—particularly against the Trump administration—raising alarms about potential partisan abuse of judicial power.
Over the course of the Biden administration, only 14 national injunctions were filed; however, within the first two months of Trump’s second administration, federal district courts had already issued more injunctions than during the entirety of Biden’s term.
Significantly, 92.2 percent of the nationwide injunctions against the first Trump administration were issued by judges appointed by Democrats, a statistic that highlights the politicization of judicial power and raises questions about impartiality.
Justice Gorsuch has echoed these concerns, noting the overwhelming number of district court judges across 94 judicial districts, which compounds the challenges posed by forum shopping where plaintiffs seek favorable rulings in targeted jurisdictions.
As public interest groups increasingly leverage this strategy to gain national relief for selectively chosen plaintiffs, the practice undermines established judicial processes and prevents higher courts from engaging with complex legal issues through circuit splits.
With the alarming uptick of national injunctions against the Trump administrations prompting justices to speak out, it seems inevitable that the Supreme Court will soon need to clarify the legality of this practice.
Given the constitutional ambiguity surrounding the issuance of nationwide injunctions by lower courts, Congress has the authority to take action.
Article III clearly grants Congress the power to establish and regulate lower courts, a prerogative that has historically allowed Congress to shape the federal judiciary through legislation encompassing the scope of judicial powers.
In historical context, Congress has previously acted to limit the authority of lower courts, exemplified by legislation such as 29 U.S.C. § 101, which restricts the issuance of injunctions relating to labor disputes.
Clear evidence exists that Congress can impose parameters on judicial authority, effectively prohibiting national injunctions as they see fit.
Before the surge of nationwide injunctions, federal district courts were known for providing injunctive relief on a more localized basis, issuing thousands of injunctions to suit specific plaintiffs rather than granting sweeping relief applicable to the entire country.
Bray’s historical analysis highlights that prior to the prevalence of national injunctions, judges routinely dealt with similar legal questions across multiple cases focused on localized disputes, ensuring a more balanced approach to judicial review and relief.
To address the complications brought on by national injunctions, Congressman Darrell Issa introduced H.R. 1526, the No Rogue Rulings Act, which aims to amend the judicial landscape surrounding these injunctions.
Passed through the House Judiciary Committee, the No Rogue Rulings Act seeks to prohibit district courts from issuing injunctive relief that affects non-parties and mandates that relief be limited to parties directly involved in the case.
Under the proposed legislation, individuals seeking injunctive relief may still file suit, but the government burden of lifting restrictions would not extend to those with differing circumstances, emphasizing party-specific judicial action.
By reaffirming the principle that judicial power should only extend to adjudicating disputes among parties before the court, the No Rogue Rulings Act posits that the existing framework sufficed in addressing injunctive litigation for nearly 200 years.
Congress may also explore historical alternatives, such as establishing three-judge panels for sensitive legal questions, as has been done in certain voting rights cases, to prevent any single judge from wielding disproportionate power over judicial outcomes.
A bipartisan coalition is already considering the viability of a three-judge panel to review national injunctions, which may help to dilute the concentration of power and reinforce judicial accountability.
As Congress deliberates these necessary changes, the debate surrounding national injunctions and their place in the judicial system is likely to intensify, and the outcome could shape the future of judicial authority in fundamental ways.
Ultimately, the emergence of the No Rogue Rulings Act signals an important moment for Congress to reaffirm its role in regulating judicial power and ensuring that federal courts serve the interests of justice without overstepping their authority.
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