Israel’s nuclear weapons program has long been regarded as one of the world’s most significant open secrets. New insights from documents obtained by the National Security Archive at George Washington University reveal the Pentagon’s concerns during the late 1960s, particularly as Israel was on the verge of activating its nuclear deterrent.
In 2006, researchers previously exposed the Nixon administration’s deliberations on Israel’s nuclear capabilities. However, a subsequent batch of documents released in 2014 has provided additional context regarding the internal debates and stark warnings issued by Pentagon officials about the potential risks posed by Israeli nukes.
One critical memorandum originated from then-Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, who on July 14, 1969, advised Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird about key matters to discuss with President Nixon. Packard’s memo reflected a strong consensus among Pentagon officials and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger that Israel’s nuclear weapons program could create destabilization within the region.
“The choices of decision before the president is to lean on the Israelis or not to lean on them,” Packard wrote. He expressed that a failure to exert pressure on Israel would inadvertently involve the United States in a partnership with Israel, placing matters dangerous to American security into Israeli hands.
The memo indicated that Israel was secretive about the scope of its nuclear arsenal, which is estimated to comprise several hundred weapons. During the late 1960s, the uncertainty surrounding the program led to doubts in Washington regarding the extent of Israel’s nuclear capabilities as well as whether other Middle Eastern states were aware of it.
The officials in Packard’s memo suggested pursuing an agreement with Israel to refrain from deploying Jericho I ballistic missiles, which could plausibly be repurposed for non-nuclear weapons. However, the memo highlighted that the missiles were likely impractical and overly costly to construct unless Israel’s intention was to develop nuclear weapons.
There was also a recommendation to postpone the delivery of McDonnell Douglas F-4 Phantom fighters to the Israeli Air Force, which was referred to as the “lean” strategy aimed at persuading Israel to reconsider its nuclear aspirations. However, the Pentagon faced an additional dilemma: concern that the Israelis lacked adequate training and resources to maintain the aircraft if delivered.
In the event of a conflict, the United States would have to rush technicians to Israel to ensure the American-supplied fighters remained operational, which could present severe political complications. The memo cautioned that these events would occur during the most politically sensitive times for U.S. involvement in the region.
The potential for public scrutiny placed the U.S. in a precarious position if they delayed the fighters’ delivery. In another memo, Paul Warnke, the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, labeled Israel’s nuclear weapons program as “the single most dangerous phenomenon in an area dangerous enough without nuclear weapons.”
Despite the weight of these assessments, Warnke expressed doubts regarding the efficacy of cancelling the fighter contract to influence Israeli leadership. By 1969, Israel was nearing the finalization of a nuclear weapon, and Warnke believed they would be both unable and unwilling to retract their program at that stage.
In the end, President Richard Nixon opted not to cancel the fighter deal, allowing Israel to develop its undeclared nuclear arsenal that persists to this day. The National Security Archive noted that the specific motivations for Nixon’s decision remain unclear, and documents explaining his rationale have not been made public.
Influence from the State Department could explain the president’s choice, with officials there warning that public knowledge regarding Israeli nuclear capabilities could jeopardize ongoing peace initiatives. The diplomats advocated for a softer approach that prioritized “persuasive tactics” to manage the situation diplomatically.
Concerns were also raised regarding the Soviet Union’s potential reactions if Israel’s nuclear abilities were to be fully disclosed. If this information became widely known, the State Department feared Arab nations would likely seek nuclear material from the Soviets, who maintained a vested interest in their Middle Eastern alliances.
While the U.S. appeared to adopt a cold yet pragmatic strategy of ignoring the existence of Israel’s nuclear program, it highlighted a troubling backdrop of realpolitik in the region. Notably, one memo illustrated the blunt American understanding of Israel’s nuclear ambitions: “Israel wants nuclear weapons for two reasons: first to deter the Arabs from striking Israel, and second, if deterrence fails and Israel were about to be overrun, to destroy the Arabs in a nuclear Armageddon.”
However, the memo also pointed out the inherent challenges in deterring irregular adversaries, which Israeli foes were increasingly becoming. In addition to provoking its rivals into pursuing their own nuclear programs, such tactics could lead to Israel’s adversaries leveraging unconventional warfare, which would prove difficult for Israel to counter in the long term.
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