May has proven to be a tumultuous month for U.S. policy in Syria, marked by both optimism and despair in a mere two weeks. Following the much-anticipated meeting between President Trump and President Ahmed al-Sharaa, where they lauded the dawn of a new chapter in their countries’ relations, tragedy struck on May 18. An Islamic State (IS) car bomb in Mayadin claimed the lives of Syrian security personnel, epitomizing the persistent threat posed by the jihadist group even as official discussions pivot toward political processes.
The car bombing underscored a pressing reality: countering IS remains a critical objective of U.S. policy in Syria, a focus that has been unwavering since 2014. In the wake of the unfortunate attack, the White House has urged President Sharaa to do all he can to thwart a resurgence of IS and to take responsibility for the numerous IS-affiliated detainees held in northeastern Syria. As this new U.S.-Syria dynamic develops, the primary challenge lies in defining a clear plan for Damascus to respond to these expectations while establishing a timeline for implementation and coordinating with allies in the region and beyond.
Since its emergence in 2014, IS has prompted significant U.S. engagement, characterized by both military and humanitarian initiatives. As the leading donor to the Global Coalition, the U.S. has orchestrated military operations under Operation Inherent Resolve, mainly partnering with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to counter the group. After the coalition’s victory in March 2019, which concluded with the dismantling of IS’s territorial hold, the U.S. military shifted to a minimized presence, emphasizing training and advising local forces.
The aftermath of IS’s military defeat has unveiled one of Syria’s ongoing challenges: the SDF’s custody of tens of thousands of IS-affiliated individuals from over sixty countries. U.S. Central Command has delineated the IS issue into three interconnected facets: the ongoing threats from IS operatives, the conditions of IS members in detention, and the potential radicalization of future generations of IS operatives, particularly among the women and children in detention camps, notably al-Hol and Roj. Observers note that a premature U.S. withdrawal could significantly exacerbate the risk of IS re-emerging, with U.S. estimates suggesting the potential for IS’s resurgence within one to two years absent ongoing U.S.-SDF collaboration.
The geopolitical landscape in Syria has drastically shifted with the removal of the Assad regime, now introducing hope for unity and stability under the new government led by Sharaa. However, the challenges are steep as Washington begins to pare down its military footprint in Iraq, which, by extension, may weaken its operational capabilities in Syria. Compounding these issues, proposed cuts and freezes to foreign aid jeopardize the ongoing support for the demoralizing conditions in detention camps.
Given the depth of the humanitarian crisis and the limitations imposed by its current political situation, Damascus can hardly tackle the multifaceted counter-IS mission independently. Hence, forging a new U.S.-Syria relationship means that Washington must articulate a coherent strategy for combatting IS while ensuring the humane treatment and eventual depopulation of the detention facilities in northeastern Syria.
Various actors in the region bring their own agendas to the broader counter-IS mission. Unlike previous regimes, the newly established Syrian government has actively sought to target IS insurgents using actionable intelligence provided by the U.S. This aligns with U.S. interests, as it helps to alleviate concerns surrounding Sharaa’s past affiliations with extremist organizations. Nevertheless, the monumental task of rebuilding a functional state raises questions about whether Damascus can realistically undertake the entirety of the counter-IS responsibilities, particularly concerning the management of SDF detention centers housing IS affiliates.
The SDF has proven to be a crucial partner in the battle against IS, having made significant military contributions while also managing detention facilities containing IS members and their families. However, as a non-state actor, its governance capabilities have been challenged, particularly concerning its fraught relationship with Turkey, which views the SDF as an extension of the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). The evolving political landscape post-Assad poses dangers for both the SDF and the camps, with fears that without continued U.S. backing, the SDF may be unable to prevent further IS resurgence.
Turkey and Iraq, bordering Syria, also pursue individual agendas intertwined with their interests in countering IS. Following the changing dynamics after Assad’s departure, Turkey has proposed leading a regional coalition alongside Iraq, Jordan, and Syria. However, initial discussions revealed Turkey’s inclination to address Kurdish concerns, which alienated potential partners and diluted the collective goal of combating IS. Both neighbors face considerable challenges: Turkey struggles to independently manage counter-IS efforts, while Iraq continues to grapple with concerns regarding Sharaa’s abilities to combat IS effectively.
European engagement has played a critical role within the U.S.-led counter-IS efforts, particularly from nations like France and the United Kingdom. Yet, European countries’ responses to the shifting dynamics following Assad’s ouster were mixed, with some pushing for sanctions relief and offering their proposals for continued operations in collaboration with the Syrian government. The positive outcome of the recent Washington-Damascus talks suggests a willingness on the part of Damascus to collaborate in preventing an IS resurgence, but whether this will translate into actionable solutions remains uncertain.
As the U.S. pivots toward a more supportive role in Syria, it must prioritize several aspects to bolster the counter-IS mission. First, Damascus must exhibit both the intent and capability to assume responsibilities for countering IS. To facilitate this, a bilateral working group should be established to address the three critical components of the counter-IS mission: countering the insurgency, managing IS fighters in detention, and overseeing IS-affiliated families in detention camps. This working group must clarify that Syria is expected to take control of the counter-IS operations while ensuring humane treatment for detainees.
Furthermore, a strong relationship between Damascus and the SDF is essential for effective counter-IS strategies. Despite U.S. aspirations for increased cooperation, progress has stagnated since the initial integration agreement, largely due to the SDF’s perception of its obligations to the counter-IS mission as both burdensome and strategically advantageous in negotiations with Damascus and international actors. Conversely, the Syrian government has expressed little inclination to acknowledge the SDF’s military experience and tactical expertise, leading to a stalemate where neither party can sustain an effective counter-IS campaign independently.
The U.S. must take an active role in persuading Turkey to curtail military actions that jeopardize broader counter-IS objectives. Ankara’s prioritization of anti-PKK initiatives, at times in conflict with regional allies’ interests, poses challenges that must be proactively managed. The recent U.S.-Turkey discussions have provided an opportunity for Washington to clarify its stance against any actions that could endanger the overarching mission to thwart IS.
Lastly, the U.S. must not overlook its European allies, who have made substantial contributions to the counter-IS campaign. While the U.S. acknowledges support from regional partners, it is paramount that Europe remains aligned with U.S. policies regarding Damascus. The burden of supporting Syria to reintegrate IS-affiliated individuals also needs to be shared, with European nations expected to expedite the repatriation of their citizens to mitigate the load on the Syrian government.
In summary, U.S. policymakers must adopt a practical approach regarding timeline expectations. The daunting counter-IS mission demands that military training, equipment provision, and intelligence-sharing be realistically planned and implemented over time. As the U.S. Defense and State Departments collaborate, it is imperative to outline a gradual approach for transferring control to the Syrian government that ensures both the effective management of IS threats and the humanitarian treatment of detainees in the respective facilities.
image source from：https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/setting-expectations-syria-countering-islamic-state
