Beijing appears poised to exploit delays in U.S. export controls as it offers the infrastructure reconstruction assistance that Syria desperately needs.
President Donald Trump’s recent announcement to suspend sanctions on Syria and seek normalized relations has been welcomed not only in Damascus but also by regional states like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, who have advocated for Washington’s support in Syria’s rebuilding efforts.
On May 23, the Trump administration took another significant step in this direction by issuing General License 25, part of its effort to roll back numerous sanctions.
However, if quick action is not taken, actors like China may seize the opportunity to step in and lead the reconstruction efforts in Syria, potentially benefiting commercially and geopolitically from such involvement.
The process of lifting U.S. sanctions is complex and slow.
Many sanctions date back multiple decades, while others were imposed during the civil war in Syria.
Certain sanctions, such as the Caesar sanctions, will ultimately require congressional approval for permanent removal.
Moreover, U.S. allies in Europe must also work through their own sanctions frameworks as well.
To realize the president’s vision fully, the U.S. will need to ease its export controls on the essential materials and equipment Syria requires to rebuild its infrastructure.
At present, Syria face stringent import restrictions for items originating from the U.S. or containing a significant number of American components.
A major source of these restrictions stems from Syria’s 1979 classification as a state sponsor of terrorism, which has historically barred it from receiving U.S. foreign assistance, accessing dual-use items, or fully engaging in international financial markets.
Additionally, the 2003 Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act prohibits the United States from issuing export licenses to Syria for any dual-use items.
Further restrictions come from the Export Administration Act (1979), the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act (2000), and the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act (2000).
Although General License 25 mitigates some sanctions, it does not comprehensively address the full scope of export controls linked to these designations.
If restrictions remain in place, the effect of this is evident: entities keen on rebuilding infrastructure in various sectors—such as transport, healthcare, and telecommunications—will have no choice but to seek out alternative suppliers.
This scenario presents a significant opportunity for countries adept at providing reconstruction assistance, notably China.
Chinese initiatives, including the Belt and Road Initiative, focus precisely on the type of infrastructure development Syria needs now.
Although General License 25 prohibits purchasing materials from Russia, Iran, and North Korea, it does not specifically preclude China.
For some time, Beijing has been cautiously engaging with Damascus regarding potential investments in infrastructure.
Beginning in early February, Chinese officials have held discussions with Syria’s ministers of agriculture and energy about possible infrastructure projects.
Last month, a delegation of twenty-two Chinese companies attended a reconstruction conference in Syria, marking their presence as the second-largest group after Turkey’s representatives.
Just days following President Trump’s announcement on sanctions, Syria’s General Authority for Land and Sea Ports signed a memorandum of understanding with a Chinese company, granting investment privileges in two locations in Homs province and Rif Damascus.
To redirect reliance away from undesirable partners—such as Russia, Iran, and now potentially China—Washington and European allies must act swiftly to relax both export controls and sanctions.
There is a precedent for these actions, as evidenced by the United States’ limited waiver in 2013 for the Syria Accountability Act, which permitted the Bureau of Industry and Security to issue licenses for exporting critical commodities and technologies needed for reconstruction in various sectors, including power, transportation, construction, irrigation, and agriculture.
While the war in Syria at that time prevented a significant uptick in U.S. exports, the items subject to the waiver still align with Syria’s current rebuilding needs.
This past experience provides a framework for relaxing export controls without fully lifting sanctions.
Easing these controls alone would significantly incentivize stakeholders to prioritize American goods and services during Syria’s reconstruction.
However, President Donald Trump should go a step further by blocking Chinese materials and equipment from playing a prominent role in Syria’s redevelopment efforts.
Minimizing Beijing’s influence has been a recurring theme during Trump’s meetings in the Middle East; he previously stated concerns that Gulf states might turn to China as a primary partner.
To maintain the momentum from his recent diplomatic trip, he should set clear expectations with Syria’s Gulf and Turkish allies that they exclude Chinese components from their reconstruction projects.
The Trump administration is at a critical juncture.
Creating a new Syrian state that leans less on traditional allies and more toward Western partnerships could greatly serve U.S. interests in the region.
This strategic shift, however, hinges on Washington’s ability to ease long-standing export restrictions imposed on Syria.
Without such action, Damascus and its allies will likely seek partnerships elsewhere, with China positioned to take the lead.
image source from：https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/trumps-first-steps-syria-were-good-now-he-must-keep-china-taking-advantage
