The military strikes against Iran’s nuclear program by Israel and the United States have ignited discussions on how these actions might influence Tehran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.
While there is a possibility that such aggressive tactics could drive Iran to accelerate its nuclear ambitions, they can also complicate its efforts and potentially provide Washington with additional leverage to deter Tehran.
Recent military actions included Israeli strikes on approximately a dozen locations related to Iran’s nuclear development, resulting in the deaths of nearly twenty scientists engaged in sensitive research.
Moreover, U.S. B-2 bombers unleashed 30,000-pound Massive Ordnance Penetrators on critical nuclear sites such as Fordow and Natanz, while cruise missiles launched from submarines targeted Isfahan.
Air strikes on industrial facilities have historically proven to be challenging, as damaged equipment can often be salvaged and made operational again.
However, the gas centrifuges vital for enriching uranium are delicate and easily compromised; instances exist where indirect effects, such as shockwaves from nearby explosions, have rendered centrifuges inoperative.
Rafael Grossi, the director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), indicated that centrifuges at Natanz and Fordow were still functioning before the assault, implying that an uncontrolled shutdown might lead to more severe damage.
In 2021, Israel successfully sabotaged Natanz by targeting its power source, and the recent strikes suggest a trend of straightforward attempts to impede Iran’s capabilities.
The massive MOPs aimed at Fordow were designed to penetrate ventilation shafts, likely debilitating centrifuge halls.
This damage could explain Grossi’s assertion that Iran’s enrichment capabilities had suffered “very serious damage.”
In response to these setbacks, Iran may attempt to establish a covert nuclear weapons program.
Reports suggest Tehran possesses spare centrifuges to replace those lost during the bombings, and the IAEA has commented on the loss of continuous surveillance regarding Iran’s centrifuge production operations since mid-2021.
Therefore, hidden stockpiles of centrifuges could be utilized to reconstruct a clandestine enrichment facility.
The institution is also likely to reassess its accumulated stockpile of enriched uranium, particularly the estimated 440 kilograms of 60 percent enriched uranium previously stored at Isfahan, Fordow, and Natanz.
If any of these materials remain unscathed, enhancing this uranium to weapons-grade could yield enough fissile material for around ten nuclear warheads.
Israeli and American officials believe much of this stockpile may be trapped under the debris, yet Iranian media suggest that some of it could have been moved to different locations prior to hostilities.
If Iran recovers some of the uranium, it would still need further enrichment to achieve weapons-grade levels.
Some analysts speculate that creating a nuclear weapon from 60 percent enriched uranium is feasible but would result in an inefficient product with minimal yield.
Moreover, it is possible that the attack on Isfahan obliterated essential equipment used for transforming enriched uranium into metal, as well as apparatuses necessary for bomb component production.
Yet Tehran may have duplicate capabilities or find alternative methods to complete these tasks without sophisticated tools.
Iran could decide against rebuilding certain capabilities, especially under the watchful eyes of Israeli intelligence services.
The timeline for Iran’s decision-making regarding its nuclear program may involve significant deliberation, much like the year it took Iraq to form a strategy post the Israeli bombing of its reactor in 1981.
With a focus on gradual advancement, Iran may choose tactics that do not provoke immediate reactions from its adversaries.
However, any attempts to revive its program would likely be met with both overt and covert action from Israel.
Iran may consider varied approaches for its nuclear redevelopment, possibly opting to build smaller, clandestine facilities concealed within industrial complexes or utilizing deeply buried installations that would withstand current military strikes.
On the other hand, Tehran may consider constructing dispersed facilities to lessen risks, albeit with potential logistical challenges such as moving nuclear materials and personnel, hence increasing exposure.
The efficacy of Israeli measures to counter these moves will hinge on its ability to gather precise intelligence about Iranian operations and execute synergies among covert and overt military strategies.
Continued geopolitical shifts could influence how Israel manages these security challenges, especially if U.S. priorities shift towards China or other regions.
Tehran’s aggressive strikes have invigorated factions within Iran that were previously cautious about pursuing a weapons program.
While momentum for nuclear weaponization within Tehran grows stronger, the strategic considerations for maintaining a hedging strategy remain appealing.
Iran finds itself more exposed than ever, while its adversaries display a heightened readiness to take risks.
The Islamic Republic’s vulnerabilities are deepened by its intelligence penetrations and the U.S. and Israeli possibilities of advanced intervention against nuclear developments.
Currently, Iran’s ability to defend its airspace against military attacks is limited, making it susceptible to future strikes.
The risk of having a nascent nuclear arsenal being sabotaged by foreign intelligence or undermined by domestic opposition presents considerable concerns.
Moreover, possessing nuclear weapons may not assure Israel or U.S. restraint, similar to how Israel’s own nuclear capabilities did not stop Iranian aggression.
Additionally, Tehran faces economic pressures and desperately needs sanctions relief, which can only be attained through negotiations leading to a new nuclear agreement with the United States.
Despite the challenges, there remains an opportunity for Washington and its allies to shape Tehran’s nuclear aspirations, even in the absence of a formal nuclear deal.
U.S. strategies should aim to deter Iran from striving to rejuvenate its nuclear ambitions through several crucial measures.
One approach is to communicate clearly to Iran that endeavors to launch a new program would likely be met with swift detection and counteraction by the U.S. and Israel.
Intelligence efforts should be intensified to penetrate Iran’s uranium enrichment programs, signaling that any attempt to establish illicit capabilities would jeopardize fixed and valued arsenals.
Moreover, it’s vital to support Israeli covert operations to disrupt any nuclear recovery activities while reiterating the possibility of renewed military intervention should such actions prove ineffective.
Encouraging other nations to refrain from supplying advanced air defense systems to nearby states ensures that vital air corridors between Israel and Iran remain secure.
The U.S. should consider sanctions relief in exchange for a commitment from Iran to dismantle all enrichment activities permanently, making it clear that reviving such initiatives would lead to renewed stringent sanctions and escalated enforcement measures.
Simultaneously, Tehran could facilitate a conducive environment for negotiations by allowing international inspectors to resume operations without restrictions.
Lastly, engaging in a discreet multimedia campaign targeting Iranian public opinion about nuclear armament could influence perceptions from within.
Such efforts should emphasize the threats posed by the pursuit of a nuclear arsenal to Iranian society, framing nuclear ambitions as a source of conflict rather than security in the greater Middle East.
The path ahead will be intricate, requiring careful navigation of diplomatic and military strategies to mitigate the threat posed by Iran’s nuclear aspirations.
image source from：washingtoninstitute
