The United States is witnessing a renewed momentum in the nuclear energy sector, particularly following a series of executive orders issued by the White House in late May.
These orders emphasize the potential role of advanced reactors in meeting the rising energy needs tied to artificial intelligence (AI) and ensuring the reliable operation of defense installations.
As part of an ambitious strategy, the U.S. administration aims to accelerate domestic nuclear infrastructure and bolster export capabilities, delineating significant goals following the executive orders.
Domestically, President Donald Trump has set an ambitious target to quadruple the country’s installed nuclear capacity by 2050, accompanied by a plan to establish 10 new large-scale reactors by 2030.
Achieving the goal of quadrupling capacity entails adding 12 gigawatts of power annually, which could manifest as 12 larger reactor units or 100 smaller, modularized reactors (SMRs), or possibly a mix of both, between now and 2050.
On the international front, the administration is looking to secure 20 new nuclear cooperation agreements by January 2029.
Although these targets are highly aspirational from technical and logistical perspectives, they provide valuable direction for various stakeholders including reactor vendors, utilities, industrial off-takers, and investors in the nuclear sector.
However, one crucial area that remains under-explored is how the United States will address its domestic supply chain deficiencies.
A viable solution may lie in forging partnerships with close U.S. allies that possess complementary industrial capabilities.
One priority area for international collaboration involves the manufacturing of specialized reactor components.
Large reactors in the U.S. commercial nuclear fleet typically require significant components such as reactor pressure vessels, which necessitate large forging and fabrication facilities.
Since the issuance of the executive orders, Westinghouse Corp. has announced plans to commence the construction of 10 new AP1000 reactors, each with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts, by 2030.
Concurrently, Texas-based Fermi America has initiated the regulatory process with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to construct four AP1000 reactor units, with the first unit expected to enter commercial service by 2032.
Although building a large forging capacity may not be essential for a fleet consisting of SMRs, it remains crucial for the construction of new large-scale reactors, as well as for maintaining existing reactors through the replacement of large components like steam generators.
The unfortunate reality is that such forging facilities have largely vanished in the United States, but the good news is that they exist in allied nations, particularly in South Korea and Japan.
This existing complementarity has already been observed in nuclear projects abroad that incorporate U.S. technologies.
For instance, the Westinghouse AP1000 projects in China, developed decades ago, sourced their reactor vessels from Doosan, a South Korean firm.
Engaging foreign suppliers for key components can be a sustainable strategy to support the U.S. nuclear sector as it competes to fulfill immediate domestic buildout needs.
Fermi’s Texas project has piqued the interest of Doosan, culminating in a memorandum of understanding that includes cooperation in supplying reactor units during a visit by South Korean President Lee Jae Myung to Washington in late August.
This type of partnership seems poised for effective replication within the U.S. nuclear landscape.
Another critical component in establishing a thriving advanced reactor market is to ensure secure and dependable access to fuel resources.
Most small, modular advanced reactors currently under development in the U.S. require High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) fuels, comprising uranium enriched to a level higher than 5 percent yet below 20 percent of the U-235 isotope.
At present, Russia and China are the only nations capable of producing HALEU at scale, raising concerns over U.S. dependence on potential geopolitical competitors for essential materials that would power the nation’s future clean energy initiatives.
The United States already imports a significant proportion of low-enriched uranium fuel for its existing large light-water reactor fleet.
Currently, domestic production meets just one-third of the total fuel needs, with around 20 percent sourced from Russia.
In response, the U.S. government has been providing direct funding and contract awards to expedite the establishment of domestic enrichment capacities.
Recently, the U.S. Department of Energy announced a federal land lease agreement with General Matter, Inc., a California enterprise selected last fall to aid in HALEU production as part of the Department’s initiative to promote private-sector enrichment services.
Investment from allied nations could provide crucial support for U.S. firms aiming to construct a domestic HALEU supply chain.
Countries like Japan and South Korea, which are also planning to deploy advanced reactors, share the U.S. concerns regarding supply chain vulnerabilities that may surface during geopolitical tensions with Russia and China.
During the aforementioned presidential visit, Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. expressed interest in exploring potential investments to support the expansion of Centrus’ uranium enrichment plant in Piketon, Ohio, highlighting how strategic investments from trusted allies can significantly impact U.S. endeavors.
Whether in terms of hardware such as reactor vessels or fuel supplies, partnerships with allied nations could effectively help mitigate U.S. supply chain challenges.
The bipartisan passage of the Accelerating Deployment of Versatile, Advanced Nuclear for Clean Energy Act of 2024 (the ADVANCE Act) signals an openness to enhanced investment opportunities from allied countries.
This legislation allows foreign ownership, control, and dominance by entities from member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) or India.
Such arrangements must align with assessments by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to ensure national security and public health are not compromised.
While much of the focus from the current administration has been on bolstering domestic capacity, this is also an opportune moment for the United States to strive for a more equitable global nuclear marketplace.
Nations like Russia and China often employ market-dumping strategies by offering sub-commercial terms when marketing nuclear power projects.
Conversely, OECD member countries involved in nuclear project exports face constraints imposed by regulations established by the OECD under the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits.
This arrangement, which was last updated in September 2024, dictates acceptable repayment terms, frequencies, and rates concerning nuclear power plants and prohibits offering free nuclear fuel, services, or ‘aid support’ as part of export credit provisions.
Multilateral development banks (MDBs) are increasingly considering support for nuclear initiatives.
Following the World Bank’s announcement in June regarding its intention to support nuclear projects, other institutions like the Asian Development Bank are also contemplating similar measures.
However, these MDBs encounter complexity since Russia and China, outside OECD membership, are not bound by its export credit laws and also serve as their donor nations.
This presents a ripe opportunity for the United States to enhance partnerships with like-minded OECD countries—many of which are also MDB contributors—to leverage collaborative knowledge and experiences to promote effective nuclear energy roles that foster energy security and economic development in the Global South.
At the same time, the U.S. must optimize its own financial capabilities within key institutions such as the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM).
DFC’s existence hinges upon timely reauthorization by early October, as its current statute nears expiration.
This agency possesses the authority to deliver direct equity capacity, debt financing, insurance, and technical assistance.
Though DFC has permitted financing for nuclear projects since 2020, its involvement in recent initiatives has primarily consisted of issuing Letters of Intent for potential U.S. projects abroad.
Successful reauthorization should be followed by measures to expand DFC’s capabilities, particularly in areas like the contingent liability cap currently set at $60 billion, which hampers significant support for substantial nuclear projects.
Moreover, the 2026 reauthorization presents an opportunity for EXIM to enhance its support for nuclear initiatives by encompassing nuclear energy in the key technology sectors eligible for increased assistance through EXIM’s China and Transformational Exports Program.
Refining the strategic utilization of these financial instruments will improve U.S. positioning to achieve the goal of forging 20 new nuclear cooperation agreements as aspired by the administration.
Partnerships with industrial allies should not be viewed as shifting job opportunities or economic benefits to foreign enterprises.
Rather, countries sharing geopolitical concerns and possessing complementary technical expertise constitute essential allies in reconstructing the U.S. nuclear supply chain.
Building these strategic international partnerships offers a clear pathway for translating U.S. leadership aspirations into tangible outcomes in the nuclear energy framework.
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