Efforts by the United States and Qatar aimed at resolving the long-standing conflict in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have gained significant traction since late June, building upon previous mediation initiatives spearheaded by the African Union, the East African Community, and the Luanda and Nairobi processes.
The roots of this conflict can be traced back to the aftermath of the 1994 Rwandan genocide, with recent diplomatic advancements being sparked by a foundational U.S.-brokered peace accord signed between the DRC and Rwanda on June 27.
This pivotal agreement saw the government of Rwanda committing to withdraw its military forces from eastern Congo. Both parties also made commitments to cease hostile acts, disarm and conditionally integrate members of non-state armed groups into the Congolese military, establish a joint security coordination mechanism, facilitate the safe return of displaced populations, and initiate a framework for regional economic integration.
However, the management of armed groups through effective military integration poses considerable risks if not correctly executed, potentially jeopardizing the entire peace framework.
Following the momentum generated by the peace accord, the Congolese government and the Rwanda-backed Alliance Fleuve Congo (AFC)/Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23) signed a Qatari-brokered Declaration of Principles in mid-July, establishing a ceasefire framework and pledging to finalize a comprehensive peace agreement by August 18.
Representatives from the DRC, Rwanda, the African Union, Qatar, and the United States convened the first Joint Oversight Committee meeting in late July, where the co-chairs were elected, and terms for monitoring ceasefire conditions and troop withdrawals were established alongside an assessment of initial stabilization efforts.
In early August, a bilateral economic framework aimed at attracting Western investment in the region’s critical mineral wealth was signed by the DRC and Rwanda; implementation of this agreement is scheduled for September.
Despite these promising developments on paper, the security climate in eastern Congo remains fraught with ongoing instability, as clashes persist between M23 rebels and pro-Congolese government Wazalendo militia across North and South Kivu provinces. Both sides are reportedly fortifying their positions.
The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), which originated from factions involved in the 1994 Rwandan genocide, continues to remain active and poses a significant threat to the fulfillment of the June 27 accord within the 90-day deadline mandated for their neutralization. Their presence lends the Rwandan leadership in Kigali a rationale for postponing the complete withdrawal of their military forces.
This military interference has raised serious allegations against the United Nations, claiming Rwanda provides direct support to the M23 while facilitating mineral smuggling from territories controlled by rebel groups. Adding to the complexity, ongoing Ugandan military operations in the Kivus aimed ostensibly at addressing the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) have been linked to a notable increase in Uganda’s refined gold exports, heightening accusations that Ugandan leaders are capitalizing on Congolese mineral resources.
Military integration, as defined in the context of the June 27 peace agreement, includes provisions for the disengagement, disarmament, and integration of non-state armed groups into the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC) and the Congolese National Police. However, it is crucial to note that neither the AFC/M23 nor any armed group operating in eastern DRC were signatories to this agreement.
Military integration, at times referred to as military power-sharing in academic discussions, represents a strategy in the power-sharing dialogue encompassing the distribution of authority within the state’s coercive apparatus. This involves incorporating or amalgamating non-statutory armed groups with statutory security frameworks, unlike the processes of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), which focus strictly on disarming combatants and supporting their transition to civilian life.
The focus of this article is the concept of military integration, which has increasingly become a part of peace treaties in recent decades, especially in scenarios where the state is unable to vanquish armed adversaries through military means. Faced with such dilemmas, governments can opt to continue military confrontations, ignore the strong presence of non-state armed groups, or pursue a political-military accommodation through integration.
Historically, the DRC has attempted military integration before, particularly following the 1999 Lusaka Agreement and the 2002 Pretoria Agreement, which saw the Congolese government attempt to engage various armed factions like the Rally for Congolese Democracy and the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo through either DDR programs or military integration.
The collapse of previous integration efforts has led to the emergence of the M23, which has fuelled instability in eastern DRC, as former fighters of the National Congress for the Defense of the People (CNDP) used the failures of prior integration attempts to justify their resurgence.
Military integration is not guaranteed to succeed in the DRC, where a variety of challenges such as deep political friction between President Felix Tshisekedi and the AFC/M23 hinder progress. The FARDC’s inability to monopolize the use of force across its territory, combined with ongoing security fears and economic incentives perpetuating conflict, complicates any potential for durable power-sharing agreements.
Research conducted on South Sudan’s experience with military integration between 2006 and 2013 has revealed critical lessons gleaned through interviews with military personnel, government officials, and peace process mediators, providing insights for the implementation of military integration in the DRC.
These lessons have broader implications for nations undergoing transitions from war to peace, reflecting common challenges faced in Syria, Myanmar, Sudan, and Yemen. The lessons presented in this article may serve as a guide for integrating armed groups into statutory security frameworks in countries characterized by weak state capacity, numerous non-state armed organizations, and fragmented political landscapes.
The following seven pillars represent key considerations necessary for military integration, which could support the DRC’s arduous journey toward sustainable stability and unlock its economic potential for the benefit of its citizens.
Pillar 1 emphasizes treating military integration as a time-bound transitional security mechanism. It is crucial to recognize military integration as a temporary strategy for managing the threat posed by non-state armed groups, rather than a long-term solution.
The fluent transition within the DRC’s previous experiences reflects the peril associated with depicting integration as an indefinite process. Such perceptions have created incentives for armed groups to manipulate the integration framework for political gain.
The peace accord’s specifications for conditional, case-by-case integration offer a unique opportunity to establish strict one-time disarmament and integration windows, promoting a shift away from short-term accommodations toward longer-term security force professionalization.
Additionally, clear timelines created by a time-bound integration process compel parties involved to implement agreements and work toward sustainable peace, thereby limiting uncertainties that might otherwise fuel retaliatory actions.
Pillar 2 advocates for the development and implementation of a structured integration roadmap. Any successful execution of military integration efforts must be guided by an overarching plan that delineates responsibilities, timelines, and benchmarks.
There remains ambiguity regarding how many of the numerous armed groups currently active in the eastern DRC will qualify for integration into the FARDC. Therefore, obtaining detailed intel on the size and structures of these groups is essential for robust planning regarding the resources and logistics required for a successful one-time integration process.
Accurate mappings of armed group characteristics will not only facilitate negotiations between government officials and armed factions but also help clarify troop placements and requirements for fitness screening and rank harmonization.
Pillar 3 highlights the necessity to synchronize integration efforts with civilian reintegration processes. Given that security force salaries tend to be more stable than civilian incomes, it is imperative that DDR initiatives run concurrently with military integration, providing similar financial support to those reintegrating into civilian life.
Failure to offer comparable economic incentives, alongside a lack of funded DDR efforts, would perpetuate cycles of violence, as ex-combatants may opt for military pathways or affiliations that guarantee economic stability.
The past implementation of tronc commun systems in the DRC demonstrated opportunities to integrate both DDR and military pathways but suffered from open-ended integration processes that fostered defections.
Pillar 4 insists that integration must precede broader security sector reform (SSR). The prevailing discourse on military integration is often overshadowed by SSR frameworks developed during peaceful transitions, where the focus was on transforming military authority structures rather than merging non-state armed factions into a unified national military.
This sequencing issue poses a significant risk, as attempts to construct SSR frameworks above inadequately integrated military forces may result in recurring factionalism, ultimately undermining the civilian oversight intended to stabilize the military.
Pillar 5 points to the interconnectivity of military and political power-sharing arrangements. The success of military integration is closely linked to the broader political landscape, where failures in one area may reverberate negatively throughout the other.
Current political-military alliances, such as the AFC formed in December 2023, require an integrative approach involving the Declarations of Principles and the evolving dynamics shaped by former President Joseph Kabila’s reemergence influencing power distributions in eastern DRC.
Should governments introduce political-military power-sharing arrangements, challenges may arise when leaders circumvent agreements to consolidate their power, potentially destabilizing relationships amid the fragile ecosystem of the DRC.
Pillar 6 emphasizes the need for cohesive integration beyond simple amalgamation. For the FARDC and former combatants to succeed as a unified national military, they cannot merely be intertwined as an amalgam of historic adversaries.
Effective cohesion necessitates a concerted emphasis on political indoctrination, a shared professional mission, and fostering social interactions among integrated forces during peace-building efforts.
Efforts to cultivate unity should take precedence post-integration, as fragmented loyalties can resurface during crises, endangering broader regional stability.
Pillar 7 highlights the value of involving third-party actors in the integration process. External entities can fulfill various roles including mediators, security guarantees, or financial and technical advisors to bolster military integration efforts.
Support from partners like Qatar and the United States may prove helpful in adding essential frameworks to build trust and enhance implementation processes, though sustained engagement from international entities remains critical given the looming instability.
The road ahead for military integration in the DRC, however, faces substantial hurdles, with many of the aforementioned pillars likely remaining unrealized. Thus, political-military power-sharing arrangements could collapse absent a clear framework to drive the integration process.
The underlying political tensions between Tshisekedi and AFC/M23 could hinder constructive dialogue necessary for genuine consensus on power-sharing, thwarting meaningful efforts.
Limited governmental institutional capacity poses yet another challenge, making the creation and enactment of a reliable roadmap for integration exceedingly difficult. Inadequate funding for DDR initiatives will likely further entrench ongoing conflicts.
Economic motivations tied to mineral wealth will persistently incentivize armed groups to resist genuine integration, complicating the resolve for a singular military structure under central authority.
Rwanda’s likely ongoing involvement through proxy forces adds crucial regional dimensions to the conflict, raising doubts about the FARDC’s capacity to deviate from past practices that merely temporize rather than resolve issues.
Nevertheless, modest successes are conceivable if the Congolese government and its international allies crucially adapt their strategies to address these pressing challenges.
Transitioning away from open-ended integration processes, creating transparent plans that discern the actual capabilities to absorb forces, and synchronizing DDR initiatives present potential avenues to foster lasting peace and stability.
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