Russia’s approach to the ongoing conflict in Ukraine hinges on the belief that it can outlast U.S. interest in supporting Ukraine and its allies. In essence, Russia has concluded that the road to Kyiv lies through Washington. Consequently, it is essential for the United States and Ukraine’s supporters to undermine this belief, as any hope of settling the conflict diminishes as long as President Putin thinks he can achieve his goals by simply waiting out the West.
President Trump’s recent announcement to increase aid to Ukraine and impose sanctions on Russia marks an important step in this direction. However, for this initiative to effectively contribute to ending the war, it requires consistent follow-through. Russia’s conviction that it can defeat Ukraine by waiting for U.S. support to dwindle represents what strategists refer to as a “theory of victory.” This concept embodies the narrative a belligerent forms about how it will ultimately win a conflict. Challenging and discrediting such narratives is crucial in persuading an adversary to seek a negotiated resolution.
Initially, Russia’s theory of victory involved executing a shock and awe campaign combined with a decapitation strategy against Ukraine’s political leadership. The Kremlin believed capturing Kyiv within three days would enable pro-Russian factions to seize control, aided by Russian forces. Internal communications from Russian intelligence during that period reflected the notion that 2,000 individuals in every Ukrainian city were prepared to support an overthrow of the Ukrainian president, underscoring a misplaced confidence in a fifth column within Ukraine.
The failure of the Russian assault on Kyiv, despite fierce Ukrainian resistance and solid Western backing, prompted a strategic pivot in the Kremlin. President Putin activated military reserves, shifted the economy to a conflict-oriented posture, and initiated an extensive internal propaganda campaign in anticipation of a prolonged confrontation. Russia’s adaptation involved diminishing Ukrainian will to fight by striking vital infrastructure, including energy grids, civilian residences, and medical facilities, while also engaging in attritional warfare on the ground.
Although the Kremlin has not publicly reframed its strategic blueprint, Western analysts have inferred that Russia’s current aim is to wear down U.S. resolve and thus weaken Ukraine’s capacity to resist. Such assessments align with the U.S. intelligence community’s 2024 threat assessment, which posits that Putin likely believes that Western and U.S. support for Ukraine is limited.
Statements from Russian officials during the recent Iran-Israel conflict seem to validate these concerns. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Alexander Yakovenko suggested that the military tensions between Iran and Israel could precipitate a swift U.S. retreat from its commitments in Ukraine, potentially leading to a recalibration of Washington’s relationship with Moscow. Russian state media contended that U.S. military actions in Iran could dampen President Zelenskyy’s aspirations for substantial shifts in the Ukrainian conflict.
The challenge in persuading Russia that its approach will not lead to victory is the unsettling reality that it may succeed. Ukraine has heavily relied on U.S. arms, strategic planning, and intelligence support since the conflict’s inception. There remains significant uncertainty regarding the repercussions of any reduction in U.S. aid to Ukraine, with officials repeatedly warning that diminished military assistance would have devastating effects. Consequently, Russia’s strategy of waiting for U.S. military support to cease eliminates the necessity of outproducing Western capabilities, which outstrip Russia’s own industrial capacity.
The asymmetrical nature of public and elite interest in the conflict further complicates the situation. Russian officials maintain that the war holds greater significance for them than it does for the United States, an observation echoed by both Western analysts and Russian leaders. This perceived asymmetry lends credence to Russia’s expectation that American commitment may wane, particularly if other international crises divert attention.
In the past year, U.S. public interest appears to have shifted, with many individuals focusing more on conflicts such as those involving Israel, Hamas, or Iran rather than the war in Ukraine. While the interplay between foreign policy elites and public sentiment is intricate, it is reasonable for Russia to assume that interest in the Ukrainian conflict will diminish amidst other pressing global events.
President Trump’s announcement to enhance support for Ukraine and impose further sanctions on Russia represents a pivotal moment in countering the Kremlin’s theory of victory. Given his previous inclinations towards Russia, President Trump is uniquely positioned to demonstrate that the assumption of waning U.S. support is unfounded. However, the announcement alone does not suffice to shift the Kremlin’s approach.
Thus far, Russian officials have not exhibited signs of discouragement after President Trump’s statement. For instance, Maria Butina, a member of the State Duma Committee on Foreign Affairs, remarked that Trump has reversed his stance on Ukraine-Russia issues multiple times; thus, she interprets his declarations as unworthy of trust. She indicated that Moscow would persist in pursuing its objectives regardless of U.S. policy fluctuations.
To truly put an end to the conflict, the United States must convey its steadfastness in supporting Ukraine. President Trump’s introduction of an increased aid package is a constructive initial gesture, yet it needs to be coupled with decisive actions, such as implementing a 50-day ultimatum for Russia to engage in negotiations. The credibility of President Trump will be crucial in dismantling Russia’s theory of victory.
Additionally, the United States and Europe can further dispel the Kremlin’s optimistic outlook by ramping up military production. Not only does this signal sustained commitment to supporting Ukraine but it also alleviates the competing priorities the U.S. faces in aiding Ukraine while also addressing obligations in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific as well as maintaining its own military readiness. While such measures are essential, they may prove insufficient to bring about a resolution to the conflict.
Outlasting American political will is not the sole theory of victory available to Russia. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has stated that Russia’s military strategy is not contingent upon the depth of U.S. involvement in the Middle East, asserting that Moscow does not anticipate a diminishment of American focus resulting from tensions with Iran and Israel. Russia continues to achieve victories on the battlefield, outproduce military supplies compared to Ukraine and its allies, and instill fear within Ukraine’s civilian population.
Should the United States ramp up its support for Ukraine, this could help level the battlefield, ensuring Ukraine is positioned more favorably in negotiations. Russia’s assertion that it can prevail by simply outlasting U.S. interest in the conflict necessitates a sustained commitment from Washington toward Kyiv. If U.S. policymakers genuinely aspire for a negotiated peace, they must effectively communicate that they are prepared to support Ukraine indefinitely. Absent such a demonstration of determination and ongoing defense production efforts, Russia has little incentive to negotiate seriously.
If President Trump’s administration seeks to foster peace, it must brace itself for an enduring conflict. Only by matching Russia’s strategic patience with unwavering Western resolve can the Kremlin’s theory of victory be effectively countered.
Alexander Palmer serves as a fellow in the Warfare, Irregular Threats, and Terrorism Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. Sofiia Syzonenko is an intern within the WITT Program. All quotes originally in Russian were translated by Sofiia Syzonenko. Additional thanks to Kelsey Hartman for editing and publication assistance and to Sabina Hung for data visualization support.
image source from：csis
