Since 2022, the Sahel region, which includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, has witnessed a significant increase in military shipments of Turkish defense articles, with at least a dozen deliveries reported.
These developments signify a burgeoning engagement between Turkey and the Sahel nations, characterized by high-level diplomatic exchanges and the rumored presence of Turkish private military companies in the area, indicating a deeper and broader partnership.
As the U.S. evaluates potential cooperation with Turkey to advance its interests in the region, it must maintain a clear and critical perspective, recognizing both the opportunities and potential pitfalls.
Turkey’s engagement in the Sahel is not a recent phenomenon; however, it has intensified amid the ongoing security crisis in these nations.
Notably, trade between Turkey and Mali has surged dramatically, increasing from $5 million in 2003 to $165 million in 2022—an astonishing 32,000% growth over two decades.
Moreover, Turkish firms have been instrumental in infrastructure development across the region, notably constructing an airport and a luxury hotel in Niamey, Niger, thereby laying a strong foundation for defense collaboration.
Since 2018, the military cooperation between the Sahel nations and Turkey has steadily escalated.
What began as a modest Turkish pledge of $5 million to the now-defunct G5 Sahel Joint Force has evolved into a more significant and multifaceted partnership.
This shift was further exacerbated by the recent coups in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, and Niger, which led the United States to suspend its defense assistance to these countries, depriving them of the ability to maintain and procure American equipment.
As regional security deteriorated and Western support stagnated, Turkey emerged as a more appealing partner for these nations.
The cornerstone of the Sahel-Turkey defense cooperation has been military equipment sales.
These efforts took off in earnest in 2022, when Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger began receiving Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones.
These drones have quickly proliferated across the continent, drawing comparisons to the iconic AK-47 assault rifle due to their affordability, reliability, and widespread availability.
The adoption of these drones marks a pivotal shift in procurement for Sahel nations, which have increasingly turned to Ankara for their defense needs.
As time progressed, drone sales continued, with Chad acquiring Anka-S drones in 2023 and Aksungur drones in 2024.
In the same vein, Mali expanded its fleet of TB2 drones, while both Burkina Faso and Mali procured the more advanced Akıncı drones in 2024.
The defense capabilities of these nations now heavily rely on Turkish-made equipment, as emphasized by Burkina Faso’s president, who highlighted the prominence of the Bayraktar TB2s and the new Akıncı drones in the country’s defense arsenal.
In addition to drones, both Burkina Faso and Chad invested in Turkish armored vehicles in 2022.
Further diversifying its capabilities, Niger also procured Turkish planes in late 2022, becoming the first to import an entirely Turkish-produced aircraft, a move quickly followed by Chad in 2023.
The Turkish military equipment has significantly enhanced the operational capacity of Sahel militaries, addressing pressing security gaps and providing new capabilities.
The Turkish aircraft and drones enable these military forces to conduct surveillance over vast territories and assert control in contested regions, effectively offsetting existing ground mobility limitations.
Reports suggest that Turkish TB2 drones played a crucial role in Mali’s 2024 successful offensive to reclaim Kidal, a rebel-controlled area deep within the Sahara Desert.
Turkey’s military sales help solidify its relationships and extend its influence within the region.
By aligning with Sahel states, Turkey not only pursues its regional interests but also seeks to elevate its standing as a leader among Muslim-majority countries.
A Turkish intelligence assessment from 2024 identified Niger as a “strategic partner,” underlining the potential to broaden Ankara’s reach within Africa.
Moreover, these alliances enable Turkey to counter competing powers in the region.
Analysts suggest that Turkey’s outreach is aimed at surpassing the influence of France and the United Arab Emirates.
Furthermore, engaging with Sahel states allows Turkey to curtail the activities of the Gülen movement, which the Turkish government has designated as a terrorist organization, blaming it for the 2016 coup attempt.
For instance, both Chad and Mali transferred control of Gülenist educational institutions to a Turkish state-backed organization back in 2017.
Sahel nations view Turkey as a pivotal security ally.
The Malian defense minister expressed a new direction for military strategy, stating that Turkish equipment would enhance territorial security and neutralize a range of threats.
In 2023, Burkina Faso awarded a state medal to the head of a Turkish defense company, signifying recognition of their partnership.
Defense cooperation may extend beyond mere equipment transactions.
A 2024 report by Agence France-Presse revealed that SADAT International Defense Consultancy, a Turkish private military firm, was reportedly active in the Sahel.
According to sources, about a thousand Syrian personnel under contracts with SADAT have been dispatched to Niger, purportedly to safeguard Turkish interests and projects in the country, though both SADAT and the Turkish Ministry of National Defense have denied these claims.
Africa Defense Forum recently noted that Turkey described these personnel as being in Niger for consulting and guarding Turkish projects, particularly in the mining sector.
Although this deployment remains unverified, media reports have indicated that SADAT personnel might have been training elite military units in Mali to prevent potential coups in 2024.
If accurate, this highlights Turkey’s intention to leverage various strategies to deepen its relationships and fulfill the security needs of these regimes.
Additionally, there are hints of Turkey amplifying its military presence in the region.
In February 2025, reports surfaced indicating that Chad had granted Turkey access to a military base in Abéché, which, if verified, would represent Turkey’s inaugural military base in the Sahel, marking a significant evolution in partnerships that have thus far been predominantly rooted in arms sales and military hardware.
The implications of this burgeoning cooperation are far-reaching.
Under certain conditions, collaboration with Turkey could align with U.S. regional objectives, particularly as Sahel nations grapple with a rising terrorist threat.
While the U.S. often faces limitations in providing defense assistance, Turkish aid circumvents such legal hurdles, directly addressing emergent capability gaps.
Turkish aircraft, armored vehicles, and drones enhance the operational capabilities of Sahel militaries, better equipping them to confront the accelerating threat posed by terrorist groups.
As terrorist operations expand, a partnership with Turkey may assist regional militaries in managing these challenges.
Turkey’s increasing role in the region also presents strategic opportunities to counter U.S. adversaries.
Turkish military equipment represents a cost-effective, high-quality alternative to offerings from China or Russia.
Moreover, SADAT could help lessen reliance on Russia’s Africa Corps, which has been involved in training and securing regimes in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger.
If confirmed, SADAT’s deployment to Mali could indicate a desire on the part of the Malian president to diversify away from Russian assistance.
However, engaging with Turkey is not without its risks.
The U.S. typically requires recipients of advanced military hardware to adhere to stringent end-use monitoring protocols, a practice that Turkey does not equally enforce regarding compliance with the law of armed conflict.
Additionally, private military contractors operate under a different set of rules compared to conventional military forces, posing several risks associated with potential SADAT deployments in the Sahel.
The less rigorous conditions attached to Turkish defense assistance compared to U.S. support could diminish U.S. influence and reputation if a partnership is pursued.
Furthermore, cooperating with Turkey won’t inherently resolve the decline of Western influence.
Turkey’s foreign policy often wavers between cooperation and competition with Russia, potentially leading to friction with European leaders.
Turkey has also received criticism for allegedly inflaming anti-colonial sentiments in Africa, an accusation that once unsettled the French leadership, who claimed alliances between Ankara and Moscow had escalated anti-French attitudes.
In response, the European Union has expressed interest in collaborating with Turkey to form a broad coalition to support the Sahel, even as Turkey pursues its own strategic objectives that may not always align with Western goals.
Ultimately, any partnership with Turkey requires careful calibration and vigilant oversight.
While joint initiatives may advance specific U.S. goals, they cannot independently rectify the broader systemic challenges posed by the growing threat of terrorism or the shifting political dynamics of Sahel states away from the Western framework.
The U.S. must remain adaptable, willing to collaborate with Turkey where interests coincide, while preserving the autonomy and flexibility necessary to protect and promote its vital national interests.
image source from：atlanticcouncil
