For many Venezuelans, the increasing tensions with the United States have already reached a critical point, and the question of whether Washington will consider more drastic measures, such as direct military involvement or regime change, looms large.
Amid these tensions, Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro is taking preparations for various potential outcomes. On September 29, 2025, Maduro signed a decree granting himself additional powers, a move that underscores his readiness for escalating conflict. Just a day later, he issued a warning regarding a potential “state of emergency.”
Military drills have already been conducted in Caracas as Maduro’s government speaks of being a “republic in arms.” This military readiness coincides with heightened American military presence in the Caribbean, where significant U.S. naval assets have been deployed. In recent weeks, at least four suspected “go-fast” drug boats were destroyed by U.S. forces, showcasing Washington’s readiness for action.
During the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, President Donald Trump emphasized that continued American military actions against drug traffickers were inevitable, reiterating accusations that Maduro is linked to drug trafficking operations. Maduro, however, firmly denies these allegations.
In response to pressure from Washington, the U.S. has placed a $50 million bounty on Maduro’s head and rejected Venezuela’s calls for dialogue. As an expert in international security and U.S.-Latin American relations pointed out, the U.S. seems to be shifting towards a stance that leans more towards regime change after a long period of uncertainty.
Despite these shifts in the U.S. stance, any direct engagement in Venezuela would likely be complicated. Even in the face of international isolation, Maduro still retains allies in Moscow, Beijing, and Havana—factors that could challenge U.S. intentions.
The recent military deployments by the U.S. Southern Command represent a notable change in posture. The USS Stockdale has joined an extensive naval presence, which includes a total of nine U.S. Navy vessels, three of which are destroyers. More than 4,500 Marines and sailors are stationed in proximity to Venezuela, where they are supported by advanced reconnaissance aircraft and drones operating from bases in Puerto Rico.
While U.S. Southern Command describes these actions as intensified counternarcotics operations, the military presence could be interpreted as preparing for heightened engagement. The possibility of an all-out invasion, however, remains doubtful as the report emphasizes that available military assets, albeit superior to Venezuela’s navy, do not number sufficient forces for extensive military action.
Caracas has also refuted U.S. actions through its own military displays. On September 15, Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino López announced military drills involving naval units and air defense assets, while Maduro proclaimed a state of “maximum preparedness.” Should a formal state of emergency be declared, it would centralize military authority within his administration.
Although Venezuela’s military capacity is not to be understated, decades of economic downturn and sanctions have significantly weakened its readiness. Despite challenges, Venezuelan forces could potentially employ asymmetric tactics to respond to a U.S. threat especially through militia activations.
On the American side, the options available for antagonistic engagement against Venezuela include targeted strikes, cyber operations, and intensified sanctions. Future escalation may depend on triggering incidents such as injuries or deaths to military personnel from either side.
Regionally, most Latin American governments exhibit reluctance to take sides in this escalating situation. A notable exception comes from Colombian President Gustavo Petro’s call for criminal investigations into U.S. military actions at the UN General Assembly.
Meanwhile, Caribbean nations show a marked lack of enthusiasm for facilitating any U.S. invasion. The prime minister of Dominica articulated that “there is no place in the Caribbean for war.” Only Guyana, affected by territorial disputes with Venezuela, has welcomed further U.S. cooperation on security issues.
An attack on Venezuela or attempts to alter its regime could unite Maduro’s allies against U.S. influence, most significantly Cuba. For years, Cuban intelligence and security forces have been embedded in Venezuela’s military structure, which complicates the situation for Washington by providing Maduro with a level of resilience.
While Cuba maintains political support for Maduro, the likelihood of military support is minimal due to its economic struggles and reduced military capacities.
Despite a lack of direct military support, Russia also represents a form of insurance for Maduro, offering diplomatic backing and military ties, such as weapon sales and military training. Although Moscow is unlikely to make substantial new military deployments, symbolic gestures, like sending bombers to Venezuelan airspace, could exacerbate political tensions in Washington.
The role of China in this conflict cannot be overlooked, given its critical position as a consumer of Venezuelan oil. As prevalent oil sanctions have reshaped trade routes, Chinese refiners have increasingly used unconventional transport methods to secure Venezuelan crude.
A U.S. action disrupting these oil flows would first affect China, likely provoking a diplomatic and commercial response from Beijing. In late September, Chinese officials condemned U.S. military posturing, underscoring their opposition against external interference in Venezuelan internal affairs.
For now, the favored route for the U.S. appears to be intensified coastal policing coupled with military presences. The ongoing counternarcotics efforts in the Caribbean may also serve to boost support for domestic opposition against the Maduro regime in Venezuela, resulting in greater internal pressure.
As financial pressure mounts through sanctions aimed at crippling Venezuela’s oil industry, the U.S. is cautious to avoid triggering a global energy crisis.
The implemented measures include targeting dollar-clearing methods, blacklisting maritime insurers, and pursuing front companies connected to oil exports.
Expectations of military confrontation have begun to solidify, as recent forecasts suggest a growing likelihood of an isolated U.S. strike against Venezuela by the end of the year, with chances increasing into 2026.
Nevertheless, a full-scale invasion seems improbable due to potential complications. Public opinion remains against military intervention to overturn Maduro’s presidency, with even stronger opposition to an outright invasion.
Ultimately, several key factors may influence the timeline and severity of U.S. actions against Venezuela, including: incidents resulting in military casualties, compelling evidence of high-level trafficking links to U.S. markets, and regional shifts toward supporting stronger actions against Maduro.
image source from：theconversation
