The disruption of Red Sea shipping by Iran-backed militias is posing significant challenges for the United States’ ability to swiftly deploy and supply its military forces in the Middle East and beyond.
To confront this emerging threat, a blend of logistical workarounds, military actions, and diplomatic initiatives is being considered as viable solutions.
President Trump initiated an ongoing military campaign against the Iranian-supported Houthi militia in Yemen on March 15.
This campaign aims to target senior officials, command centers, weapons depots, and infrastructural sites within Yemen to secure freedom of navigation in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait.
These waterways are crucial for global trade, facilitating approximately $1 trillion in goods annually along with 30 percent of the world’s container traffic.
Moreover, they play a pivotal role in transporting military logistics for the swift deployment of U.S. resources to multiple operational theaters.
The increased Houthi attacks, particularly since the onset of the Gaza war in 2023, have escalated threats against both commercial and military vessels, challenging what the U.S. regards as a core national interest.
A Strategic Challenge: The Iranian Strategy
This new threat has emerged in the context of Iran’s broader strategy to empower its proxies, such as the Houthis, to limit adversaries’ freedom of maneuver within the region.
During prior military campaigns in Iraq in 1991 and 2003, the U.S. and coalition forces relied heavily on Persian Gulf ports for logistic support.
In response to such buildups, Iran developed an anti-access/area-denial (A2AD) strategy, utilizing proxy militias and advanced weapon systems to threaten access to the Gulf.
In Yemen, Iran’s support has enabled the Houthis to threaten Red Sea traffic and key Saudi ports like Jeddah, furthering Iran’s strategy to block alternative logistic routes while also fulfilling Houthi interests.
The group’s use of precision strikes with an array of drones and missiles has demonstrably evolved, attributed to the training and equipment provided by Iran.
In response, allied military vessels have continued to navigate the Bab al-Mandab, but many commercial shipping firms have opted for the longer and more costly route around the Cape of Good Hope.
This shift poses serious implications for U.S. military logistics, particularly as the U.S. relies on commercial shipping to transport approximately 80 percent of its defense materiel.
The Defense Department often relies on the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement during crises to access privately owned vessels, enhancing flexibility and ensuring rapid deployment.
However, the current situation reveals that without secure supply lines, the movement of military logistics during critical operations becomes increasingly jeopardized.
Given the finite resources of the U.S. Navy and diverse global commitments, not every shipment can be protected by escorts, making the escalation of Houthi threats a significant concern.
Logistical Impacts on Military Operations
The implications of this situation are particularly dire.
For instance, a hypothetical oil shipment from the Arabian Sea to Rotterdam would face an estimated fifteen extra days and up to $1 million in additional fuel costs if rerouted around the Cape of Good Hope.
Thus, similar delays could be anticipated for military logistics operations reliant on shipping routes impacted by these conditions.
If commercial carriers were to navigate the Red Sea regardless of risk, the additional costs from war risk insurance could inflate expenses by nearly 1 percent of hull values.
For the U.S. and its allies, prolonged transit times would disrupt urgent military resource movements across vast operational theaters.
The interconnected nature of global great power competition necessitates rapid asset shifts between the European, Central, and Indo-Pacific theaters, making access to Bab al-Mandab vital.
Moreover, sealift remains the most cost-effective means for military logistics compared to airlift, which is increasingly in demand.
While airlift will continue to be utilized for immediate repositioning of high-value assets, exploring alternative transportation methods, particularly overland routes, may prove advantageous.
An Overland Alternative to Shipping Disruptions
The Houthis have demonstrated capabilities to target cargo ships across much of the Arabian Sea and northern Indian Ocean, making maritime transport highly vulnerable, especially during cargo offloading.
However, once goods are offloaded to trucks or other vehicles for intra-theater transport, opportunities for interception diminish significantly.
By diversifying transport routes beyond the Bab al-Mandab, the Defense Department could lessen the threat posed by the Houthis.
The Trans Arabian Network (TAN) is a strategic initiative proposing 300 logistics nodes—airfields, sea ports, and ground hubs—across the Arabian Peninsula aimed at diversifying shipping options.
For instance, vessels could bypass the strait and dock in Jeddah, with subsequent cargo transported onward by air or ground.
While Jeddah remains vulnerable to Houthi attacks, introducing alternative routes could complicate targeting decisions for the militia and afford the U.S. military greater flexibility in operational planning.
While the TAN has shown promise through proof-of-principle trials by U.S. Central Command since 2015, it currently faces challenges including customs delays and inefficient regulations.
If fully operational, the TAN could potentially manage thousands of tons of cargo daily, closely rivaling the trade volume of the Strait of Hormuz.
As it stands, however, issues related to contractor effectiveness, military cargo limits, and browser compatibilities with transportation modes impede its full potential.
Additionally, the UAE-Israel land corridor provides another promising route, facilitating trade from Israel’s Haifa port through Jordan, Saudi Arabia, to the Persian Gulf while bypassing the Red Sea entirely.
Two transport companies currently operating along this corridor—Trucknet from Israel and PureTrans from the UAE—could be beneficial partners for the U.S. military.
The corridor reportedly has the capacity to handle 350 trucks daily, competing with or exceeding what a fully operational TAN could offer.
Regardless of selected strategies, the U.S. must prioritize flexible and resilient logistical alternatives while maritime shipping is under threat.
By investing in security measures and ramping up air defenses at ports, both the TAN and the UAE-Israel corridor could fulfill U.S. transportation needs in the Middle East, streamlining supply chains to allied locations.
Policy Recommendations for the U.S.
To maintain effective logistical access to the region, the United States and its military partners ought to pursue a dual approach.
This strategy should focus on (1) addressing immediate needs through pragmatic workarounds and exerting pressure on the Houthis, and (2) seeking long-term solutions to neutralize the ongoing threat to maritime logistics.
Key recommendations include the following:
1. Maintain Pressure: The United States must render the Houthis unwilling or unable to threaten shipping.
This requires expanding the military campaign beyond airstrikes, with a focus on credible ground forces partnered with allies such as Saudi Arabia or the UAE.
Backing the Presidential Leadership Council could pave the way for effective counteractions amid the current campaign.
2. Shift Focus Upstream: The administration should also work to deter Iran—primary backer of the Houthis—by showcasing the bolstering of U.S. Central Command capabilities in the region.
Highlighting deployments such as B-2 bombers or an additional aircraft carrier can present serious strategic dilemmas for Tehran and should be utilized in ongoing nuclear negotiations.
3. Expand Security Cooperation: The United States should accelerate diplomatic initiatives to forge a coalition of countries that benefit from a secure Red Sea, involving key regional players including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
The European Union’s naval task force, Aspides, while currently under-resourced, represents a critical foundation for defensive burden-sharing.
4. Explore Alternative Routes: While securing the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab remains essential, U.S. efforts should prioritize developing flexible land-based alternatives such as the TAN and the UAE-Israel corridor.
Adopting these measures allows the United States to establish a comprehensive strategy for mitigating the Iranian-backed Houthi threat to military logistics and maintaining global trade security.
Ultimately, it is imperative for the U.S. to reassess current logistics operations in light of persistent instability to ensure sustained access to critical supply lines across the region.
image source from：https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/houthi-threat-checkmate-us-military-logistics
