The election of U.S. President Donald Trump was met with enthusiasm from the Israeli government, particularly from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, primarily due to Trump’s stance on Iran.
Israel perceived the new administration’s approach as a potential opportunity for military action against Iran’s nuclear facilities, especially given the increased military presence of the U.S. in the region and vocal threats from U.S. officials about serious consequences should Iran fail to dismantle its nuclear program entirely.
However, a shift in tempo occurred following Trump’s recent indication of intent to initiate nuclear negotiations with Iran during a meeting with Netanyahu.
This unexpected development has led to a growing divide between Washington and Jerusalem, particularly as discussions between Tehran and the U.S. have unfolded, suggesting a mutual interest in reaching an agreement.
Reports imply that the U.S. has relaxed its demand for the complete dismantling of Iran’s enrichment sites, signaling a willingness to settle for limitations on Tehran’s current nuclear capabilities.
Israel regards such a diplomatic approach as a grave concern, as it runs counter to its strategic preference for a regime change in Iran rather than merely curtailing the nuclear program.
The Israeli government views any nuclear agreement, even one that significantly constrains Iran’s ability to develop nuclear weapons, as detrimental because it risks legitimizing and bolstering the Iranian regime.
To Israel, the most dangerous outcome would be a strengthened Iranian regime courtesy of economic relief generated by a deal with the U.S., which could lead to enhanced military capabilities and greater support for Iranian proxies in the region.
Amid this backdrop, Netanyahu has dispatched envoys to engage with U.S. negotiators in an attempt to persuade Washington against striking a deal with Iran, but these efforts were to no avail.
From the U.S. perspective, limiting Iran’s nuclear capabilities remains paramount, with the understanding that a regime change is not the primary objective.
This divergence is evident not only in attitudes towards the nuclear agreement but also in the sanctions regime imposed on Iran.
While Israel likens sanctions to tools for regime change, Washington views them as leverage primarily aimed at nuclear negotiations.
Even if the U.S. and Iran reach a satisfactory arrangement—one that might limit Iran’s enrichment capacity to 3.67 percent without a sunset clause, require the export of enriched material, dismantle advanced centrifuges, and uphold rigorous oversight—Israel would expect this agreement to fall short in tackling Iran’s broader threats, such as its missile capabilities and regional proxy support.
Critically, an agreement could also diminish the already limited leverage Israel holds with the U.S. regarding military action against Iran.
The political consensus in Israel, including from various opposition leaders, strongly advocates for a strike on Iran, creating pressure on Netanyahu to oppose any agreement—even if this contradicts any private reservations he might hold.
This issue is further complicated by Israel’s call for a “Libyan model” to be implemented concerning Iran, which indicates a demand for the complete dismantling of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure—a condition likely unacceptable to Tehran.
Israel may rely on the expectation that the U.S. will adopt its stringent position, anticipating that Tehran’s inevitable rejection will rekindle discussions of military options.
Fundamentally, there exists a substantial gap between Israeli and U.S. perspectives concerning the Iranian regime’s intentions regarding its nuclear program.
Israeli officials have long contended that Iran aims to produce nuclear weapons, a claim repeatedly countered by U.S. intelligence assessments that find no evidence of such intentions from Iranian leaders.
Notably, while Netanyahu praises Israel’s aggressive measures to prevent Iranian nuclear advancement, U.S. intelligence agencies have posited that Israeli actions may have, paradoxically, advanced some facets of Tehran’s enrichment capabilities.
This significant divergence in viewpoints contributes to the U.S. administration’s inclination towards diplomacy, particularly as American intelligence suggests that a military strike could provoke a wider regional conflict.
This misalignment reflects a broader uncertainty regarding the sufficiency of Iran’s current vulnerabilityC
Even if Israel perceives Iran as weakened in light of both internal strife and external pressures, U.S. intelligence calls attention to Iran’s capacity to retaliate against American interests in the region, potentially igniting a larger conflict.
Ultimately, Israel is likely to oppose any form of agreement with Iran that merely contains its nuclear ambitions, as it sees the nuclear issue as part of a wider spectrum of challenges posed by the Iranian regime.
If the Israeli government believes it has a window of opportunity to orchestrate the regime’s downfall, the ongoing negotiations pose a serious threat to that possibility.
This discordant dynamic between Washington and Jerusalem indicates the potential for significant future tensions, given that Israel may find itself handcuffed in its response to a U.S.-Iran agreement.
As negotiations proceed, the question remains whether Israel can navigate these challenges effectively.
image source from：https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/why-israel-will-resist-any-us-iran-nuclear-deal/
