The impending expiration of the New START Treaty, the only remaining bilateral nuclear arms control agreement between the United States and Russia, is prompting national security experts to consider the next steps in nuclear stability.
With the expiration date set for early 2026, some strategists propose that the United States initiate negotiations for a new nuclear agreement while continuing to adhere to New START’s limits.
However, the argument for maintaining these constraints is misguided; the United States must move beyond New START to address the current geopolitical landscape.
When New START was signed in 2010, it offered certain benefits, including constraints on deployed strategic nuclear warheads, limiting each country to 1,550 warheads.
At the time, the treaty held domestic political utility as well, allowing Democrats to gain Republican support by agreeing to modernize aging strategic nuclear forces.
Yet, this treaty was established under a geopolitical environment that no longer exists.
In 2010, Russian President Vladimir Putin’s ambitions were only beginning to manifest, and the resurgence of a belligerent Russia was not yet fully formed.
Additionally, at that time, many considered China largely benign and primarily focused on maintaining its military within its borders.
Fast forward fifteen years, and the global situation has dramatically shifted.
Both Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have emerged as aggressive leaders with expansionist agendas.
While Russia claims to have modernized 95 percent of its strategic nuclear forces, it has also developed novel intercontinental systems designed to circumvent New START constraints.
Moreover, Putin has deployed a regional nuclear force featuring approximately 2,000 short- and medium-range lower-yield weapons capable of launching from various platforms.
This development undermines previous agreements aimed at reducing tactical nuclear weapon inventories.
China, on the other hand, is undertaking what U.S. Strategic Command’s former commander Admiral Charles “Chas” Richard described as a “strategic breakout.”
China’s rapid nuclear arsenal growth is staggering, and it is expected to evolve into a full-fledged nuclear peer to the United States, contributing to a reorganized regional nuclear force in collaboration with Russia.
In a modern Threat Landscape of two nuclear-armed adversaries, New START is no longer effectively safeguarding U.S. and allied security.
The treaty’s restrictions hinder the United States’ capacity to deter both Russia and China effectively.
Furthermore, New START does not address the short-range nuclear weapons that either country might be inclined to use first during a conflict.
Consequently, New START has become an inappropriate instrument for the present strategic climate.
The future requires the United States to allow New START to expire and to begin enhancing its own nuclear capabilities.
Historically, arms control agreements have been employed to limit threats from potentially aggressive nations, yet they have been only partially successful.
These treaties often falter when signatories harbor aggressive intentions, leading to violations or shifts in competition into unregulated areas.
For example, naval treaties from the 1920s and 1930s aimed at limiting capital ships inadvertently fostered competition in submarines, which were excluded from those limits.
Likewise, the Soviet Union and now Russia remain frequent violators of arms control agreements.
Since his rise to power, Putin has breached nine arms control agreements, reflecting a pattern of disregard for such commitments.
Recent reports indicate that he is likely to violate new agreements as well, including contraventions of both the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement.
Thus, the prospect of engaging in meaningful arms control negotiations with Putin appears slim given his aggressive actions.
Similarly, U.S. nuclear discussions with China seem unlikely.
China views any proposal for arms control as a sign of weakness, characterizing transparency and verification demands as intrusive, akin to espionage.
Past efforts for dialogue have been dismissed by Beijing, and China is unlikely to pursue arms control until it achieves parity with both Russia and the United States.
In summary, without a significant shift in leadership in either Moscow or Beijing, a new nuclear agreement seems improbable.
While this is disappointing, the truth remains that arms control cannot replace robust deterrent policies.
History indicates that developing strategic nuclear forces creates significant dilemmas for adversaries, solidifying U.S. and allied security.
Rather than adhering to outdated agreements, the United States must maximize its deterrent capabilities in light of global realities.
Moving forward, the United States should prepare for strategic posture adjustments as New START limits expire.
To do so, the U.S. should revisit changes made to its nuclear capabilities to conform to New START limitations.
For example, the deactivation of nearly 100 launch tubes for Trident II ballistic missiles on the Ohio-class submarines could be reversed.
Moreover, the restoration of nuclear capabilities to around 30 B-52 bombers that were stripped of such armaments would enhance deterrent capacity.
The U.S. should also consider increasing the number of warheads on its existing submarine-launched Trident II missiles and land-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles.
In the medium term, expanding the U.S. Strategic Modernization Program will help respond to the evolving nuclear environment.
A modest increase in deployed warheads would suffice to maintain credible deterrence against both adversaries simultaneously.
For instance, the number of Columbia-class strategic nuclear submarines should be raised from a minimum of 12 to at least 15, and B-21 bombers should increase from 100 to a minimum of 150.
The goal is not to match Russia or China weapon-for-weapon but to ensure the U.S. maintains a strategic force capable of responding adequately to either adversary.
As New START expires, it will be crucial for the United States to shed the Cold War assumptions that have underpinned it.
Most nuclear arms agreements from SALT I in 1972 to New START have primarily focused on intercontinental-range systems, overlooking regional nuclear forces.
This oversight stems from the assumption that any nuclear engagement would rapidly escalate to intercontinental weaponry.
However, such an assumption is increasingly untenable in the modern context, where the first use of nuclear weapons is likely to emerge from escalating regional conflicts.
Given Putin’s recent threats and Russia’s significant regional nuclear arsenal, the inadequacy of New START is evident.
The potential for conflict underscores the necessity for an updated approach that encompasses regional nuclear threats in Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
Going forward, any new arms control treaty should establish an overall limit on all deployed nuclear weapons between the parties, encompassing both regional and intercontinental systems.
Under such a framework, nations would have the flexibility to adjust their nuclear mix while maintaining an agreed-upon ceiling, thus enhancing military force credibility.
However, traditional arms control advocates may voice objections as an increase in the total number of weapons would seem counterproductive.
Yet, a treaty that accounts for the existing reality of Russia’s nuclear stockpile would not only reflect current dynamics but also facilitate honesty in negotiations.
Identifying and verifying regional nuclear weapons could prove challenging, but both sides must recognize their mutual interest in establishing limits.
If goodwill cannot be established, pursuing a treaty would be futile.
In the interim, the United States should take every step possible to maximize the deterrent potential of its current arsenal.
Attempting to cling to New START constraints in hopes of enticing Moscow back to negotiations will only reinforce outdated Cold War mentalities.
As the U.S. strives to adapt to the emerging challenge of countering two nuclear peer nations, it is imperative to respond with strong, modernized deterrent capabilities that align with the contemporary geopolitical landscape.
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