Over the past 25 years, India has become a focal point in U.S. foreign policy, an observation that has held true since the George W. Bush administration. The strategic partnership between the two nations was built on a principle of strategic altruism.
U.S. policymakers viewed India’s growth—economically, militarily, and diplomatically—as beneficial to American interests in the long run. With a stronger and more prosperous India, markets would open for U.S. companies, regional deterrence against China would bolster, and India could act as a democratic counterweight to authoritarian regimes in Asia. From this perspective, India’s ascent was seen as an opportunity rather than a threat.
However, the return of President Donald Trump to office could alter this longstanding approach. The new Trump administration is not driven by a desire for cooperation but rather by a determination to assert U.S. dominance in every foreign relationship. This shift is particularly evident in how the U.S. now expects India to practice strategic altruism by making concessions and producing results while limiting its demands.
Despite India’s commitment to strategic autonomy and a policy of ‘multi-alignment,’ this new requirement could prove uncomfortable, yet it might be necessary to navigate the challenges of Trump’s second term and position India favorably for the future.
The concept of strategic altruism was articulated in 2019 by former U.S. Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill and South Asia scholar Ashley Tellis. They argued that since the turn of the century, a realization took hold among U.S. officials that it was in their interest for India to grow as a democratic and militarily capable power in Asia. The emergence of Beijing as a strategic competitor saw Washington treat New Delhi as a natural ally, particularly in preventing China from dominating the region and undermining global order.
For the past two decades, this doctrine of strategic altruism underpinned U.S.-India relations even if it was never formally recognized. Each administration put its distinct mark on the growing partnership. The Bush administration’s civil nuclear agreement in 2005 was pivotal, effectively removing India from being labeled a nuclear pariah. The Obama administration recognized India as crucial in its ‘pivot to Asia’ and in ensuring a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific.’ Even during Trump’s first term, significant continuity was observed due to various factors.
After China’s aggressive maneuvers along the border with India in 2020, India gradually abandoned its previously cautious stance toward Beijing. This moment helped reinvigorate the Indo-Pacific alliance known as the Quad, which includes the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, while also increasing defense and diplomatic cooperation.
During the Biden administration, ties further deepened, especially regarding collaboration on critical and emerging technologies, including semiconductor production and joint initiatives in space.
Although Trump’s first term had its turbulence, strategic altruism had not collapsed entirely. His administration did promote transactionalism, especially with its ‘America first’ policies, but the presence of foreign policy veterans in his cabinet insulated India from his more unpredictable tendencies.
The COVID-19 pandemic shifted diplomatic actions, giving India’s pharmaceutical industry prominence in the global arena at a time when India was navigating its own challenges. This situation led to stronger ties as mutual benefits emerged.
Despite hopes of managing his return to office, many Indian policymakers are realizing that a second Trump term could impose challenges unique to its context. Unlike his previous administration, Trump 2.0 is characterized by a severe skepticism toward traditional alliances, combined with a belief that major allies have not reciprocated the benefits conferred by the U.S. Officials in the new administration are showing less interest in India’s strategic utility.
Furthermore, the incoherence surrounding U.S. policy towards China leaves India’s strategic positioning uncertain. Different factions within the Trump administration express varying opinions on how to engage with China, causing confusion in New Delhi.
Now that Trump has effectively halted the longstanding U.S. approach of strategic altruism, the expectation has shifted dramatically. The current U.S. administration is vocal in asking, ‘What can India do for us?’ There is a clear sense that negotiations with India will come with conditions.
The Trump administration has put pressure on India to address several key demands: Australia, India, Japan, and the United States must engage in reciprocal tariff negotiations, which could see India facing a 26% tariff on imports unless it provides substantial trade concessions. Indian officials are hopeful for a trade agreement to be finalized before an upcoming deadline, recognizing the urgency.
In defense relationships, the U.S. is insisting on increased purchases of American-made military equipment. While India is diversifying its defense procurement, the Trump administration perceives its pace as insufficient. Trump’s offer of F-35 fighter jets, typically reserved for close allies, illustrates the potential for deepening military ties but may also place pressure on India’s traditional relations with countries like Russia.
In terms of energy, the U.S. seeks assurances from India regarding purchasing more American liquid natural gas and oil. India has already bought more oil from the U.S., and increasing these purchases further could pave the way for favorable relations, but such commitments may require legislative adjustments in India due to liability laws that have thwarted American investment in the civilian nuclear sector.
Facing these dynamics, India is at a crossroads: it may need to practice a form of strategic altruism itself, accepting that it may have to deliver today for potential benefits tomorrow. This approach might feel uncomfortable for a country that values its strategic autonomy. Still, it could be seen as a pragmatic response to an uncertain international environment.
Historically, India has required substantial foreign capital to power its domestic ambitions. The country’s growth trajectory of around 6.5% is commendable but insufficient for fulfilling its aspirations of becoming a developed economy by 2047. For India to thrive and seek domestic transformation, it requires significant investment inflows, especially from the U.S., which currently show signs of stagnation.
India also finds itself in a vulnerable security situation regarding its conflicts with neighboring Pakistan and military pressures from China. As military infrastructure develops around India’s borders and tensions persist, collaborative engagement with the U.S. for security becomes imperative; defense and economic resilience largely hinge on this partnership.
Moreover, India’s technological ambitions have gained international attention, especially as it prepares to host significant events, such as a global AI summit in 2026. While India possesses substantial engineering talent, it lacks the necessary infrastructure and resources to become a leader in rapidly evolving fields like artificial intelligence. Iranian officials have hinted at creating opportunities for U.S. tech firms within India, which could transform the tech landscape and boost collaboration.
However, the domestic political landscape acts as a counterweight to these aspirations. Modi’s ruling BJP prides itself on nationalistic posturing, which stands in contrast to conceding to U.S. demands, especially when it comes to matters affecting farmers and agriculture—an area highly sensitive in Indian politics.
This pressure may force India to navigate carefully when responding to U.S. expectations, focusing concessions on products less likely to ignite domestic backlash, such as luxury goods rather than agricultural staples.
India’s previous strategy of raising tariffs and remaining outside wider trade pacts has failed to yield the desired economic growth. Faced with growing challenges, Prime Minister Modi’s government is strategically considering utilizing Trump to frame tariff cuts as necessary sacrifices in the face of a demanding U.S. administration while striving for economic reforms. If Modi plays this card well, he may secure long-term economic gains and better integrate India into global supply chains.
Modi’s government, despite setbacks in recent elections, still enjoys substantial popular support which enables it to explore ambitious initiatives. If Modi can navigate the complexities of U.S.-India relations strategically, a favorable position could emerge for India amid the current uncertainties. However, skepticism persists as the future leadership dynamics remain challenging and the risks attached to strategic concession lurk heavily in the backdrop.
In conclusion, the shift in U.S.-India relations under Trump’s second administration presents potential threats balanced against opportunities for India. The immediate future may require significant concessions, yet the ultimate aim remains: to strengthen India’s position domestically and globally amidst an evolving geopolitical landscape.
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