In October 2022, the United States imposed sweeping restrictions on the export of advanced chips and chip-making equipment.
This move followed steps taken in the first Trump administration to curtail China’s access to cutting-edge semiconductors and marked the beginning of a comprehensive effort to cut China off from the world’s most powerful computer processors.
These processors are essential for developing and running sophisticated artificial intelligence systems that could be used to power autonomous weapons, conduct mass cyberattacks, and augment intelligence collection.
Officials recognized that U.S. export controls would not be effective on their own.
The semiconductor supply chain is global, with countries like Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea producing crucial equipment, materials, and components for chip production.
Therefore, genuinely hindering China’s progress would require persuading these countries to align their efforts with the United States.
In the first Trump administration, officials were able to successfully pressure the Dutch to stop selling advanced chip-making equipment to China.
Building on this effort, the Biden administration initiated a systematic diplomatic campaign to further restrict China’s access to advanced technologies.
This approach presents clear advantages.
Other nations produce semiconductor technologies that could significantly enhance China’s capacity to manufacture advanced chips.
For example, the Dutch firm ASML is the only company in the world capable of producing extreme-ultraviolet lithography machines, crucial for printing intricate designs on the most advanced chips.
Plurilateral controls ensure that Chinese firms cannot simply substitute U.S. equipment with alternatives from countries like the Netherlands or Japan.
Moreover, collaborating with allies aligns with the Biden administration’s broader preference for diplomacy over unilateralism.
The strategy has produced notable successes, with the Dutch and Japanese governments announcing their own semiconductor export controls in 2023 and early 2024.
Nevertheless, there are significant drawbacks.
Coordinating controls can be time-consuming and demanding of compromises, allowing China the opportunity to stockpile advanced chips and equipment during this interval.
Amid concerns about a dwindling U.S. lead in the AI competition with China, it may be tempting to abandon diplomatic efforts in favor of a more aggressive unilateral approach.
The inclination towards unilateral action is reinforced by the second Trump administration’s general preference for such strategies.
However, the United States must consider the substantial risks and limited benefits associated with acting alone.
Expanding extraterritorial U.S. restrictions on selling materials and equipment to China could allow Washington to maintain a technological edge over Beijing in the short term.
Additionally, it may help level the playing field for U.S. technology firms compared to their foreign competitors.
Yet, the effectiveness of these actions relies heavily on the sustainability of the U.S. technological superiority over time and the underlying diplomatic leverage that may be eroding.
While working alongside foreign partners to restrict technology exports has proven successful in curbing China’s capabilities, maintaining some measure of diplomacy is essential for continued success.
Export control diplomacy is no easy task.
Foreign countries, even close U.S. partners, often hesitate to limit their companies’ access to Chinese markets or craft novel regulations at the urging of U.S. diplomats.
Under optimal conditions, coordinating export controls is a lengthy process that demands consensus on both strategic approaches and nuanced technical specifics.
This difficulty can hinder policymakers’ abilities to respond swiftly to technological advances, providing China with time to accumulate essential chips and components.
These challenges are not merely theoretical.
Foreseeing tighter restrictions, China notably increased its imports of Dutch lithography machines by four times in 2023, prior to new controls being fully realized.
In the first seven months of 2024, as the United States and its allies deliberated on tightening regulations, China imported around $26 billion worth of chip-making equipment—a record high.
While this raised profits for companies like ASML, Tokyo Electron, and Applied Materials, it also represented a significant setback for the effectiveness of U.S. export control measures.
Moreover, when it pertains to China, other countries typically exhibit greater risk aversion than the United States, particularly given Beijing’s propensity to retaliate against semiconductor export controls.
For example, Japan has faced threats regarding access to critical minerals utilized in automobile production.
In addition, many countries prefer to meet a higher evidentiary standard before taking action.
As a result, the U.S. is often confronted with the choice of enhancing its unilateral efforts—which could disadvantage U.S. firms by denying them the maximum access to Chinese markets or
image source from：https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/how-america-can-stay-ahead-china-ai-race
