Since taking office in January, U.S. President Donald Trump has frequently voiced his concerns regarding the control of nuclear weapons, labeling these arms as “big monsters” and the world’s “greatest existential threat.”
Trump lamented the extensive financial resources allocated to nuclear arsenals, emphasizing that their potential use could signify the end of the world.
This emphasis on nuclear restraint from Trump is timely.
In light of the global instability associated with his administration, Trump’s inclination towards nuclear limits could pave the way for the negotiation of genuine nuclear restrictions, which are urgently needed worldwide.
The nuclear arms control landscape is in decline.
The 2010 New START Treaty represents the sole remaining arms control agreement between the United States and Russia.
New START, which I led negotiations for on the U.S. side, imposes limits on the number of nuclear warheads, missiles, and launchers each nation can deploy, incorporating various verification mechanisms for compliance.
However, this treaty is set to expire in February 2026, less than a year away.
Its effectiveness has already been compromised, particularly following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s declaration in February 2023 that Moscow would halt implementation of the treaty while the U.S. continues to aid Ukraine.
This marked the first time in nearly 60 years of nuclear dialogue that Moscow linked arms control to unrelated issues.
Consequently, the Kremlin has since been unwilling to engage in any nuclear discussions.
During this time, China has been busily modernizing its nuclear capabilities.
Once possessing a modest arsenal of around two hundred warheads intended primarily for retaliatory purposes, China now boasts over 500 nuclear warheads and is increasing its production of delivery systems.
With significant investments in all three components of the nuclear triad—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers—China’s capabilities to launch nuclear weapons from land, sea, and air have significantly expanded.
The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that by 2035, China may possess as many as 1,500 nuclear warheads, all while remaining reticent about its rapid buildup in discussions with Washington.
In the near future, the United States could find itself confronting two nuclear powers, Russia and China, each with comparable numbers of warheads.
These two allies could potentially pose a first-strike threat that may surpass U.S. deterrence capabilities, leading to catastrophic regional and global consequences.
Despite the gravity of the threat, it remains manageable.
The United States has a better chance of reaching arrangements with Moscow and Beijing regarding nuclear matters than on the various military, political, and economic conflicts that exist among them.
If the Trump administration can successfully re-engage Russia to maintain nuclear parity while also initiating dialogue with China over nuclear risk control, the three nations could avert a Cold War-style nuclear arms race, a costly and dangerous endeavor.
Trump’s approach to nuclear weapons has been notably long-standing; as early as the mid-1980s, a young Trump sought to be appointed as the U.S. lead negotiator for arms talks with the Soviet Union, though unsuccessfully.
Despite his reputation for frequently altering his stance, Trump has consistently maintained a focus on nuclear threats and the importance of controlling them.
He views these weapons as poor investments, questioning the wisdom of spending resources on arms that, if deployed, would likely result in global annihilation.
Frustrated by previous setbacks in addressing nuclear issues during his initial term, including failed negotiations with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and a lack of progress on arms reduction deals with China and Russia, Trump appears determined to revisit these discussions.
In February, Trump expressed his desire to engage in talks on nuclear matters with Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, indicating that such discussions are a priority for him.
While full denuclearization might be an unrealistic expectation, there remains ample opportunity for meaningful progress with Russia and China on different fronts.
In the case of Russia, the U.S. is dealing with a peer in terms of nuclear capability.
For six decades, the U.S. and Russia have maintained a nuclear relationship based on parity, allowing flexibility in force structure as long as the overall numbers remain below mutually agreed limits.
Historically, the U.S. has favored a higher number of sea-based missiles, whereas Russia has leaned toward land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.
Over the years, both countries have engaged in extensive discussions to control, limit, and reduce their nuclear arsenals through treaties and unilateral initiatives.
However, the current limitations on nuclear arms are deteriorating.
Trump’s objective should be to restore these limitations.
When it comes to China, the primary goal should be to persuade Beijing that predictability and stability are in its best interests.
Currently, China’s nuclear forces remain significantly smaller than those of the United States, and while their modernization is swift, they are unlikely to achieve parity for another decade or more.
In the interim, the U.S. should engage China to comprehend their objectives and offer assurances about future force structure and modernization plans, thereby reducing the risk of misunderstandings that could lead to nuclear crises.
Rather than concentrating on the magnitude of China’s arsenal, the U.S. should aim to foster mutual understanding and self-restraint to stave off an arms race—essentially, promoting arms control.
When addressing nuclear negotiations with Russia, the pathway appears relatively clear.
Negotiators from the United States and Russia have extensive experience spanning nearly 60 years, which facilitates smooth interactions between the two sides.
Despite occurring during periods of heightened tensions, such as after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, both the U.S. and Russia recognized the existential threat posed by nuclear weapons, fostering commitments to isolate nuclear discussions from broader geopolitical conflicts.
Even during surges in tensions, such as Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, the United States and Russia continued to implement New START.
However, this resolve faltered following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, resulting in Putin’s suspension of New START compliance.
Notably, Putin has since hinted at a willingness to resume negotiations, indicating that he remembers the impending expiration of New START in February 2026.
Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov has commented on the evolving tone from Washington since Trump’s inauguration, seeing potential for renewed nuclear discussions.
Even if Moscow and Washington are unable to finalize a new treaty before New START expires in February 2026, it doesn’t have to lead to an arms expansion.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the absence of a nuclear arms treaty did not result in uncontrolled escalation, as the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to adhere to previous arms limits from the SALT II agreement, which, although not ratified, established a framework for arms control.
A similar approach could be adopted today, with both nations publicly committing to uphold New START limits until new terms are established.
Additionally, China, France, and the United Kingdom, as nuclear states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, should agree not to undermine New START by accelerating warhead numbers or deploying destabilizing systems.
However, negotiating with China poses a more intricate challenge.
China’s rapid modernization of its nuclear arsenal raises concerns in Washington and among allies that Beijing seeks to match or surpass U.S. capabilities, both nuclear and conventional.
If China’s arsenal reaches an estimated total of 1,500 warheads by 2035 and all are deployed, it could equate to the warhead limits specified by New START.
In a worst-case scenario, the combination of Chinese and Russian capabilities could create a threat level that deters the U.S. from pursuing its interests effectively.
While such a scenario necessitates preparedness on the part of the United States to protect itself and its allies critical to U.S. deterrence, it is vital to maintain a clear perspective regarding the extent of the threat.
Both the U.S. and Russia may each deploy 1,550 warheads under New START, but they retain a substantial number in reserve.
With the U.S. holding about 5,277 warheads and Russia approximately 5,449, if pressed, the U.S. could mobilize additional warheads from reserves, increasing its capacity to respond.
Some warheads could be mounted on both land and sea missiles, and others designated for delivery by bombers.
However, should the U.S. be pressured into exceeding New START limits with additional missile deployments, it could provoke a reciprocal response from Russia, triggering an arms race.
This underscores the necessity for China to commit to preventing actions that might undermine existing limits and provoke U.S. responses.
This is where negotiations become crucial.
Although the U.S. lacks the extensive history of nuclear negotiations with China that characterizes its relationship with Russia, it does possess relevant experience.
The United States and China interact through significant multilateral frameworks, including the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.
Furthermore, China currently leads the five-country forum consisting of the nuclear weapons states recognized under the NPT (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), indicating an understanding of nuclear negotiation stakes.
Nevertheless, China has consistently resisted engagement, arguing that the disparity between Chinese and U.S. nuclear capabilities renders transparency in diplomacy a vulnerability for China.
Chinese diplomats maintain that discussions can only commence after the U.S. and Russia decrease their arsenals.
This stance has remained firm, even as China has modernized its arsenal, including new missile silos falsely dismissed as wind farms.
Frustration has characterized both the Trump and Biden administrations toward China’s reluctance to discuss its nuclear advancements, with similarly unfruitful engagements framed around compelling China to be part of New START negotiations—a request both administrations faced rebuff from Beijing.
During a 2023 summit in California, Biden believed he had forged a breakthrough with Xi regarding nuclear talks, yet once again, Beijing declined this opportunity.
It is important to recognize that the current context may be different.
With New START nearing its end, negotiations can be approached from a fresh perspective without the constraints of a legally binding treaty for China to resent.
Nonetheless, multiple obstacles could hinder progress.
Nationalistic voices in both Washington and Beijing may seek to block constructive dialogues.
The ongoing U.S.-China trade war complicates matters further.
Additionally, while Trump has exhibited interest in nuclear discussions with Xi, it remains unclear whether he ranks nuclear negotiations with China as highly as he does with Russia.
The optimal path for Washington would involve engaging in two parallel negotiations.
The first should target Russia to extend the limits established by New START and pursue additional restrictions on all nuclear warheads, whether deployed or in reserve, encompassing both strategic and non-strategic systems.
In his first term, Trump made strides by gaining Putin’s tentative agreement to a freeze on nuclear warhead stocks, which serves as a foundation for moving forward to seek limits on Russia’s latest delivery systems, including the Poseidon nuclear-propelled and -armed torpedo.
From Moscow’s perspective, Trump’s discussion of a new U.S. missile defense system, termed “the Golden Dome,” may lead Russia to demand that such defenses be included in negotiations.
They worry that robust U.S. missile defenses could destabilize the credibility of Russian nuclear deterrence, as the U.S. could begin to perceive a first-strike scenario against Russia as less risky.
This apprehension has influenced Putin’s views on arms control and his initial criticisms of New START due to its lack of constraints on U.S. missile defense systems.
If Russia insists on discussing missile defenses during negotiations, the U.S. should reciprocate by requesting limits on Russia’s advanced missile defense systems, such as the S-500.
Conversely, negotiations with China, emphasizing nuclear arms control, should prioritize obtaining a commitment from China not to expand its nuclear stockpile or deploy systems that could undermine New START limits.
China must exhibit greater transparency about its nuclear modernization efforts and take steps to mitigate misunderstandings between U.S. and Chinese nuclear postures, minimizing escalation risks.
Potential strategies in this package could include data exchanges, notification prior to missile tests, joint definitions for nuclear terminology, and enhanced crisis communication channels.
While the primary focus of negotiations with China should be on establishing controls rather than strictly numerical limits, the U.S. should advocate for a mutual ban of the fractional orbital bombardment system (FOBS).
FOBS, which uses unpredictable trajectories and could strike without warning, poses a significant risk to critical command-and-control facilities.
The 2021 FOBS test conducted by China heightened concerns in Washington, underscoring the urgency of including such prohibitions in future talks.
Trump should seize this critical window of opportunity without hesitation.
Even if the challenge of Senate ratification proves too significant for the U.S. to agree to a legally binding nuclear arms treaty—although Trump’s influence over Congress might mitigate this—well-structured political agreements with Russia and China could still yield positive results.
Beyond engaging in these discussions with Beijing and Moscow, Trump should also reassess the implications of his ambiguous support for U.S. allies in Europe and Asia as such sentiments ripple into proliferation discussions.
While Trump vocally opposes the expansion of nuclear arsenals, his actions could inadvertently motivate countries like Germany, Poland, and South Korea to deliberate openly on establishing their own nuclear capabilities.
If Trump genuinely aims to curb nuclear threats, he must reinforce the U.S. commitment to extended nuclear deterrence.
By alleviating the urge for allies to develop independent nuclear programs and halting the potential arms race with China and Russia, Trump can contribute to a more stable and safer global environment.
image source from：https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/arms-control-not-dead-yet
