Iraq’s remarkable economic and security recovery—the most successful since the 1970s—faces a serious threat. Contradictory signals from US President Donald Trump’s administration in Washington on Iraq’s Iran-connected Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), in particular, risk derailing hard-won progress just as Iraq prepares for crucial parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2025.
Trump’s first administration defeated ISIS in Iraq, establishing today’s foundation for progress. His second administration, currently in power, can build on these successes by developing a distinct Iraq strategy that supports full economic, political, and security independence from Iran—a policy approach that treats Iraq as its own strategic priority rather than an extension of Iran policy.
What’s at stake is not merely Iraqi domestic politics, but a significant US foreign policy success story in a region where such achievements have proven elusive.
Washington’s Iraq success story at risk.
The first Trump administration, in power between 2017 and 2021, inherited a troubled Iraq—but that landscape has changed with a rather remarkable turnaround for the US president’s second term.
Against considerable odds, Iraq has built functioning democratic institutions that regularly transfer power through elections. The country’s US-designed Supreme Court, however imperfect and controversial, has peacefully resolved complex political disputes that would have triggered violence in many neighboring states.
Perhaps most impressive has been the unprecedented cooperation among traditionally adversarial Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish leaders, enabling peaceful resolution of longstanding Baghdad-Erbil disputes that previously threatened territorial integrity. Iraq has improved its foreign policy both regionally and globally, playing a positive role in bridging relations between Iran and the Arab world.
Despite internal and foreign pressure, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani successfully navigated the delicate balance between Washington and Tehran. In part due to his own building of a unified front in Iraq, paired with regular, direct talks with the previous US administration under former president Joe Biden, al-Sudani prevented Iraq from being dragged into the region’s intensifying Iran-Israel conflicts.
These political achievements rest on a foundation of economic revival. Banking sector reforms, coordinated with the US Treasury and JP Morgan, have dramatically reduced money laundering and illicit cash transfers that once funded extremist groups and corrupt networks.
Infrastructure development has transformed Baghdad’s urban landscape, while high oil prices have replenished national reserves. In 2024, Iraq conducted its first successful national census since 1987—an extraordinary administrative achievement that provides the demographic basis for fair electoral district allocation.
The security situation has stabilized to the point that Iraq no longer dominates international headlines for terrorist attacks or sectarian violence. These gains directly serve American strategic interests while providing a powerful counternarrative to claims of US foreign policy failure in the Middle East.
Mixed signals from Capitol Hill versus the White House.
A dangerous communication gap has emerged that threatens this progress. Since Trump took office in January 2025, a story of US “demand” to Baghdad to dismantle PMF dominated national attention in Iraq. Al-Sudani has stated his government has received no formal demands from Washington regarding the PMF’s future.
Yet simultaneously, Iran’s Ambassador to Iraq has claimed that the United States has discussed PMF dissolution directly with Tehran—not Baghdad. This contradiction creates an untenable position for Iraqi leaders.
Adding to the complication is the bipartisan “Free Iraq From Iran Act” in the US Congress, spearheaded by Republican Congressman Joe Wilson and Democrat Jimmy Panetta, which sets sights on “irreversibly” dismantling all “Iran-backed puppet militias in Iraq,” including the PMF.
Iraqi leaders who experienced Washington’s regime change war that stemmed from Congressional action view such legislation as a potential harbinger of future policy. When congressional initiatives explicitly call for “PMF dismantling” without distinguishing between Iranian-influenced elements and the broader security apparatus, Baghdad’s political class understandably approaches this with historical caution.
Trump administration officials have not made any public statement to confirm or distance the White House from the Congressional bill. Therefore, many Iraqis interpret forceful PMF dismantling as an attempt to end Shia majority rule, contrasting with the Trump administration’s stance against regime change while simultaneously refusing to tolerate Iranian proxies threatening US and allied interests. This apparent contradiction has created significant confusion between Baghdad and Washington.
This diplomatic ambiguity bears troubling resemblance to April Glaspie’s unintentional “green light” to Saddam Hussein before the 1990 Kuwait invasion, where imprecise communication was interpreted as tacit approval. Without clear, direct messaging, Iraqi officials are left to interpret US intentions through competing channels, creating conditions for strategic miscalculation.
The PMF reality.
The PMF emerged from necessity in June 2014 when the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) captured Mosul, and Iraq’s conventional military collapsed. What began as an emergency security measure gained extraordinary legitimacy through battlefield sacrifice and effectiveness against a genocidal enemy.
Today’s PMF is a complex institution that defies simple categorization. While Tehran has indeed exploited the PMF framework to embed limited units of proxy forces, treating the entire 250,000-member organization as a monolithic Iranian asset fundamentally misunderstands Iraqi reality.
The overwhelming majority of PMF personnel are ordinary Iraqis who answered Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s call to defend their homeland when state forces failed. These soldiers report to Baghdad, not Tehran, and provide economic support to approximately 1.25 million Iraqis in southern provinces where poverty rates reach over twenty-five percent.
Even prominent Shia political figures within the Coordination Framework coalition privately oppose Iran’s control over certain armed factions but recognize the broader institution’s legitimacy among their constituents. PMF members and their families represent significant voting blocs in Shia-majority provinces—a political reality no elected Iraqi official can ignore.
The challenge lies in distinguishing Iranian-influenced elements without destabilizing Iraq’s fragile security architecture or triggering mass unemployment among trained fighters, repeating the deadly mistake of dismantling Sunni Awakening units by former prime minister Nouri al-Malki.
The parliamentary impasse threatening elections.
Iraq’s parliament now finds itself deadlocked over two competing bills concerning the legal status and future of PMF. A government-sponsored bill would institutionalize PMF units within Iraq’s formal military structure under direct prime ministerial command—strengthening Baghdad’s authority while preserving the force’s symbolic importance to communities that sacrificed to defeat ISIS.
An alternative bill from the PMF Commission seeks financial independence through investments and companies, potentially creating a state-within-a-state similar to models seen in Iran and Lebanon. The second bill does not have majority support even among Shia blocs, let alone Kurds and Sunnis.
The message from the United States seems to be vague and generic by objecting to the PMF bill altogether but offers no alternative. Parliamentary sessions have halted amid this disagreement, creating collateral damage for electoral preparations.
The Council of Ministers has set November 11, 2025, for parliamentary elections, but this requires lawmakers to pass a new electoral law within weeks. Iraq’s Supreme Court has ruled that parliament cannot extend beyond its four-year term, creating a constitutional deadline that cannot be ignored without democratic backsliding.
The paralysis threatens both Iraq’s constitutional timeline and its security gains. The Shia blocs cannot afford to abandon the PMF bill without an acceptable alternative. Doing that under pressure will be seen as an abandonment of PMF which will have devastating consequences on the street and for the upcoming elections.
If elections are delayed due to failure to pass enabling legislation, the resulting legitimacy crisis could reignite street protests and potentially draw the Sadrist movement back into confrontational politics. This constitutional uncertainty creates openings for precisely the destabilizing forces the United States aims to counter.
Washington’s strategic interests in Iraq’s stability.
Iraq stands as a crucial American ally in a volatile region, hosting thousands of US troops and receiving hundreds of millions in security assistance. It serves as a strategic counterbalance to Iranian influence while representing a rare case of democratic development in the Middle East.
The current policy confusion threatens these advantages while undermining America’s credibility as a reliable partner. Rather than freeing Iraq from Iranian influence, rejecting PMF institutionalization wholesale could trigger widespread instability.
Attempting to disband 250,000 armed personnel would not only risk civil unrest but create security vacuums exploitable by extremist groups or Iranian-backed militias operating outside state control. The most likely outcome would be weakened Iraqi government authority—precisely opposite the stated US objective of strengthening Baghdad against Tehran’s influence.
The way forward.
For the Trump administration to preserve Washington’s investment in Iraq while effectively countering Iranian influence, it must direct clear, consistent communication to Baghdad. This means explicitly distinguishing between legitimate Iraqi security services and Iranian-controlled “resistance” factions, while supporting Iraqi-led efforts to bring all armed groups under state authority.
The White House should clarify whether the bipartisan “Free Iraq From Iran” bill reflects the Trump administration’s policy, recognizing how Iraqi leaders interpret such signals. Supporting Iraq’s constitutional timeline means backing timely elections while avoiding actions that could delay democratic processes.
Rather than demanding wholesale PMF dissolution—which risks triggering civil conflict—the administration should leverage Washington’s strong bilateral relationship to encourage gradual integration of nationalist elements into conventional security forces, while isolating Iranian proxies.
Iraq’s stability represents a remarkable US foreign policy achievement amid regional turmoil. By speaking directly to Baghdad with messaging that respects Iraqi sovereignty while addressing legitimate security concerns, Washington can safeguard its investment while advancing regional stability.
The alternative—policy ambiguity that undercuts Iraqi institutions—would represent a strategic gift to US adversaries in the region. The path forward lies not in sweeping demands that ignore Iraqi realities, but in nuanced diplomacy that distinguishes between Iran’s proxies and Iraq’s legitimate security needs.
The United States’ substantial investment in Iraq’s future demands nothing less.
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