President Donald Trump’s proposed missile defense initiative, the “Golden Dome,” aims to offer protection against various missile threats including ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles, as well as those launched from space.
Trump has set an ambitious objective for Golden Dome to be operational within three years, before the conclusion of his term.
However, experts warn that the goals for Golden Dome may be overly optimistic.
Numerous studies indicate that even less expansive missile defense systems than what Trump envisions are likely to be prohibitively costly and not as effective as anticipated, particularly against missiles equipped with advanced countermeasures.
These countermeasures can include multiple warheads per missile, decoys, and warheads capable of evading detection through maneuverability.
Beyond concerns about effectiveness and feasibility, historical research underscores a significant implication: missile defenses often render the host nation less secure against nuclear attack instead of providing enhanced safety.
As a national security and foreign policy scholar at Harvard University, I lead the “Managing the Atom” research group focusing on nuclear weapons and nuclear energy policies.
In my professional experience, dialogues with Russian and Chinese nuclear experts reveal consistent anxieties regarding U.S. missile defense initiatives.
Both Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese leader Xi Jinping have voiced concerns, describing Golden Dome as destabilizing to global strategic stability.
A joint statement from China and Russia expressed worries that such a defense system could incite an arms race, thereby amplifying conflict potential among nuclear-armed states and on a global scale.
While this could be perceived as propaganda, it echoes genuine apprehensions shared by both nations.
Historically, lessons learned over the past fifty years indicate that pursuing initiatives like Golden Dome may provoke heightened arms buildups, complicate the prospects for nuclear arms negotiations, and possibly elevate the risk of nuclear conflict.
In my first book, published 35 years ago, I argued that U.S. national security would be best served by adhering to the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which placed strict limits on missile defenses held by both the U.S. and Soviet, later Russian, forces.
The ABM Treaty was born from the SALT I negotiations, the initial agreements aimed at curtailing the nuclear arms race, and it received overwhelming bipartisan support in the Senate, passing with a 98-2 vote.
The rationale for limiting defenses between the two superpowers stemmed from the understanding that unlimited defenses would only drive extensive offensive nuclear arms development on both sides.
Both nations recognized that to deter a first strike, it was essential to maintain the capacity for retaliation – a concept often summarized as “don’t nuke me, or I’ll nuke you.”
For instance, during the 1960s and 1970s, when the Soviet Union deployed 100 interceptors to protect Moscow, the U.S. responded by amassing even more nuclear warheads aimed at the city, attempts to overwhelm its defenses.
The realization emerged that in the event of a nuclear war, Moscow could suffer even greater devastation should interceptors exist than if they had not, leading to a paradox where both sides were rendered less secure.
Moreover, countries perceived an adversary’s defensive capabilities as complementing their nuclear offensive capabilities.
A first strike that could incapacitate a significant portion of an opponent’s nuclear arsenal would lead to a scenario where missile defenses could effectively counter a haphazard retaliatory strike, making the prospect of such a strike more appealing.
This possibility creates a grim outlook in terms of escalating tensions during nuclear crises.
Unfortunately, the withdrawal of President George W. Bush from the ABM Treaty in 2002, which aimed to allow the U.S. to defend against potential attacks from smaller nations like North Korea, did not lead to an immediate arms race or the collapse of nuclear arms control mechanisms.
Nevertheless, Putin has been vocally critical of U.S. missile defense efforts, viewing them as a threat to Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities.
In response to perceived threats, Russia has been investing significantly in advanced strategic nuclear weapons designed to bypass American defenses, including innovative systems such as intercontinental nuclear torpedoes and missiles capable of circumventing traditional defensive measures.
Concurrently, China is expanding its nuclear arsenal, likely motivated by concerns over U.S. capabilities that have the potential to undermine its nuclear deterrent.
China’s strong reaction to the deployment of U.S. missile defenses in South Korea exemplifies this anxiety, leading to severe sanctions against South Korea as a warning.
Trump’s aspirations for the Golden Dome extend significantly beyond past efforts, promising to eliminate missile threats to the U.S. homeland with anticipated success rates nearing 100%.
Experts predict that such overreaching ambitions could trigger even larger nuclear arsenals in both Russia and China.
The joint declarations from Putin and Xi specifically mention their intention to “counter” U.S. defenses perceived as attempts to achieve military superiority.
The reality is that countermeasures against missile defenses are becoming increasingly sophisticated and challenging for existing systems to address, resulting in a precarious offense-defense relationship that could leave the U.S. in a weaker security position and financially burdened.
Particular alarm arises from Trump’s vision of deploying thousands of space-based interceptors capable of neutralizing missiles shortly after launch.
Most nations are likely to oppose the placement of vast numbers of weapons in space as it escalates the potential for conflict; these interceptors are not only costly but also susceptible to countermeasures.
China and Russia might significantly invest in developing anti-satellite weapons, raising the stakes for space warfare.
Moreover, the ongoing complexities surrounding nuclear arms negotiations are further exacerbated by the impending expiration of the last treaty limiting U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals – the New START Treaty, set to lapse in February 2026.
Amid China’s rapid nuclear growth, many defense analysts in Washington are calling for increased American military modernization as a countermeasure.
Given prevailing intense tensions, both Russia and China seem disinclined to engage in serious discussions regarding nuclear arms limitations in any form, leaving the future uncertain.
In my assessment, the introduction of Golden Dome into this already volatile environment could extinguish the possibility of preventing a future rife with unchecked and unpredictable nuclear arms competition.
However, there are alternatives that could be explored.
Designing missile defenses that might offer limited protection – for example, against the potential threats posed by a small number of missiles from North Korea – while accommodating the offensive capabilities of major powers is plausible.
Establishing restraint frameworks could contribute to the international community’s confidence in managing existing nuclear forces amid evolving missile defense capabilities.
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