In recent months, a new consensus has emerged among nuclear deterrence experts regarding the future of the United States nuclear arsenal, raising the question: does the country require more or different nuclear capabilities than what has already been planned?
The discussion is largely informed by the 2023 Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (SPC), which reveals significant collective support for maintaining and modernizing the U.S. nuclear capabilities.
This consensus advocates for the full implementation of the existing nuclear modernization program, an increase in warhead capacity of both legacy and modernized forces, and the advent of both nonstrategic and strategic capabilities to strengthen the U.S. deterrent posture.
Experts argue that the time has come for Washington to move beyond policy discussions and begin executing these necessary plans without further delay.
A wide range of practitioners from both Republican and Democratic circles underline this growing alignment in nuclear policy. Vipin Narang, the former Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, indicated that while the current plans are essential, they may ultimately fall short of the needs of the coming years.
However, challenges arise as the Trump administration, along with Pentagon officials, have not yet shown the same enthusiasm for pursuing significant expansions in the U.S. nuclear program.
Despite endorsing the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) due to congressional direction, the Trump administration has not actively advocated for an expansion of the planned nuclear modernization program.
In a public statement, President Donald Trump reiterated that there was no compelling reason to invest in new nuclear weapons, declaring, “We already have so many.”
Furthermore, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright echoed this sentiment, suggesting that the focus should remain on modernization rather than increasing the existing nuclear stockpile.
Budget constraints cast a further shadow over the future of U.S. nuclear capabilities, as current proposals indicate flat funding for the defense budget, with any potential increases likely coming from one-off spending measures that do not guarantee sustainable support for enhanced nuclear capabilities.
The National Defense Strategy (NDS) Commission reaffirmed the SPC report’s findings, stressing the existential nature of the ongoing nuclear modernization projects, but refrained from endorsing additional nuclear capabilities, emphasizing instead the necessity to modernize and expand conventional forces such as the Navy and Air Force.
Within the defense community, many current Department of Defense (DoD) officials exhibit a lack of deep understanding of nuclear deterrence issues.
They often underestimate the risks posed by simultaneous nuclear conflicts and tend to believe that the U.S. already possesses sufficient nuclear capabilities to deter multiple threats.
Additionally, there is concern that increasing the U.S. nuclear stockpile might instigate further expansions of Russian and Chinese arsenal, fostering a mindset that prioritizes nonnuclear capabilities.
As budget graphs become tighter and decisions become imminent, a nuclear consensus does not inherently equate to financial backing for new nuclear investments.
To bolster nuclear deterrence, it is essential to persuade decision-makers across various government levels about the risks of deterrence failure and the importance of prioritizing nuclear capabilities over nonnuclear budgets.
Three vital audiences need to be convinced of this necessity: nonnuclear strategists in the Pentagon, the Office of Management and Budget, and senior administration leaders including the Secretary of Defense and the President.
To resonate with these groups, proponents of nuclear investment must recalibrate familiar arguments in a way that emphasizes nuclear capabilities’ critical role in enhancing U.S. security.
The first argument highlights the indispensable role nuclear weapons play at the onset of any crisis.
As policy expert Herman Kahn noted, the initial deployment of nuclear weapons tends to aim more at influencing adversary decision-making rather than merely incapacitating military resources.
In tensions with nuclear-capable adversaries, the threat of nuclear escalation becomes a concern from the outset, as both Russia and China possess doctrines reflecting a profound stake in regional conflicts.
Both nations view the early stages of a conflict as existential threats, given historical precedents of devastating failures along their borders.
Thus, it is paramount for U.S. leaders to recognize that strategic deterrence becomes crucial at the very beginning of confrontations, and that any failure in this regard could compel adversaries to escalate their military actions earlier than anticipated.
Secondly, the nuclear arsenal plays a vital role in supporting the United States’ capability to conduct conventional military operations.
If adversaries attempt to leverage nuclear options amid a deteriorating conventional conflict, the President must have available forces capable of deterring such actions.
A flexible nuclear
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