In the mid-2030s, the South Pacific’s security landscape is being reshaped by China’s extensive network of dual-use ports and airfields.
These developments, presented as civilian initiatives, represent a significant threat to vital sea lanes and limit the operational flexibility of the United States and its allies.
As China enhances its regional capabilities, it is increasingly tilting the balance of power in its favor.
A recent wargame conducted by the US Marine Corps War College illustrated these concerns, showing that Beijing could firmly establish its dual-use access before Washington could mount an effective response.
Should a crisis erupt under these circumstances, the United States and its allies would find themselves at a severe disadvantage.
The presence of Chinese-controlled facilities poses a substantial strategic dilemma for the US military.
A direct military strike on Chinese-maintained ports could precipitate dangerous escalations, while inaction would confine allied forces and jeopardize critical supply lines.
China’s capability to deploy military assets under the guise of civilian operations adds further complexity.
The potential for long-range missiles hidden within shipping containers transforms these commercial facilities into potential launchpads for unexpected attacks.
Moreover, these ports could function as intelligence-gathering centers, monitoring regional military movements.
Even in less overt scenarios, China could exploit its port access for grey-zone operations, deploying maritime militia disguised as civilian vessels to spy on and disrupt allied activities.
To prevent these scenarios from manifesting, Washington and its allies must pursue a comprehensive strategy on multiple fronts.
First, a multi-domain strategy should be devised to deter or mitigate the impact of Chinese dual-use ports during any crisis.
This strategy should incorporate both overt military options and covert measures such as cyber and electronic warfare to undermine China’s foothold before it becomes a military urgency.
If conflict appears imminent, US forces must be positioned to disable or seize these critical ports preemptively; in peacetime, quiet sabotage of ports’ control systems might diminish their strategic value.
Moreover, the United States should prioritize the pre-positioning of resources and forces in Pacific Islands to enable rapid responses while maintaining readiness in other theatres.
Second, strengthening military partnerships in the Pacific is vital. This includes expanding access to military bases and airfields while enhancing defense relationships with Pacific Island nations.
Recent developments reflect this commitment: in 2023, the US signed a defense agreement with Papua New Guinea and renewed security accords with Palau, the Marshall Islands, and Micronesia in 2024.
Such actions have preserved essential basing rights and are complemented by investments in infrastructure, including over-the-horizon radar systems in Palau and upgrades to the airfield on Yap.
Each new logistical hub complicates China’s domination efforts in the region.
Conducting regular joint military exercises in less contentious areas, like northern Australia and Guam, can enhance readiness without provoking local communities.
In addition to military engagement, the United States should bolster diplomatic and economic partnerships to mitigate Beijing’s influence on Pacific Island nations.
Many regional states exhibit hesitance to confront China due to fears of economic backlash, necessitating that Washington engage with their pressing needs.
Addressing issues such as climate change, infrastructure decay, and trade opportunity serves as a way to demonstrate the tangible benefits of partnership with the US.
In practice, this could translate to enhancements in development aid and provision of weather-resilient infrastructure, offering credible alternatives to Chinese financing.
US Navy Seabees, for example, could be deployed for infrastructure projects like building schools and clinics, signaling visible American support.
Assisting the Pacific nations in ways that do not tie them deeper into Chinese influence counters Beijing’s leverage and encourages leaders to either align with Washington or remain neutral.
Moreover, illuminating China’s covert activities and coercive tactics is crucial for maintaining regional stability.
Chinese distant-water fishing fleets have greatly impacted local fish stocks, while networks associated with China are implicated in activities such as drug trafficking across remote islands.
By exposing these harmful practices through international media and forums, and leveraging diplomatic pressure, Washington can damage Beijing’s reputation and build skepticism among Pacific nations about becoming too reliant on China.
Simultaneously, there is a necessity for unity among allies in countering Chinese attempts to foster discord within the region.
Collective efforts to debunk false narratives propagated by China, while amplifying positive initiatives and coordinated outreach, can reduce Beijing’s ability to exploit divisions among Pacific states.
The South Pacific’s strategic significance must not continue to be an overlooked priority.
The establishment of a Chinese outpost in this area could jeopardize US logistics and the viability of military operations in East Asia.
Given the potential for these installations to be masqueraded as civilian, the urgency to counteract them before reaching a crisis point becomes even more critical.
The choice before Washington and its allies today is stark.
By reinforcing deterrence, solidifying regional partnerships, and actively resisting Chinese expansion, they can thwart any ambitions China may have for dominance in this critical segment of the Indo-Pacific.
Should they falter, however, they risk bolstering Chinese influence and drastically increasing the costs and complexities of future conflicts, thereby constraining the United States’ operational freedom in its own strategic backyard.
If decisive action is taken now, the dangerous scenarios described need not come to fruition; hesitance would instead invite a strategic disadvantage that might have been averted.
image source from：lowyinstitute
