This week marked the beginning of Talisman Sabre, a significant biennial military exercise involving Australian and US forces.
Described as the largest and most sophisticated war-fighting exercise ever conducted in Australia, Talisman Sabre brings together approximately 35,000 military personnel.
The three-week exercise serves as a crucial demonstration of the strong bilateral ties between Australia and the United States, particularly in light of recent concerns surrounding the AUKUS defense pact.
While some may view the US Department of Defense’s decision to review AUKUS as a potential threat to the alliance, this assessment could be overly pessimistic.
It is common for new administrations—both in the US and its allies—to reassess agreements such as AUKUS.
The ongoing review should be contextualized within a broader US strategy aimed at promoting enhanced defense industry cooperation to address shared security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region.
In a recent speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth updated the public on the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR).
The launch of PIPIR represents a significant effort to strengthen US-led defense industrial collaboration under an ‘America first’ approach, particularly as a counter to China’s rising military capabilities.
The dual frameworks of AUKUS and PIPIR could play vital roles in fortifying US deterrence in the Indo-Pacific.
It is important to clarify common misconceptions about AUKUS, which is not merely a new alliance or a commitment involving military force like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue among Australia, India, Japan, and the US.
AUKUS consists of two primary pillars, each offering distinct advantages for the United States and its Indo-Pacific Command.
Pillar I focuses on developing nuclear-powered, non-nuclear-armed attack submarines, with initial training efforts already underway.
Australian personnel are currently learning nuclear submarine technology from their US and UK counterparts, which is a strategic step towards establishing an operational submarine rotational force in Perth by 2027.
This will feature US and UK submarines, paving the way for Australia’s purchase of Virginia-class submarines in the early 2030s while it develops its own nuclear submarine production capabilities by the 2040s.
However, concerns are mounting regarding the US industrial base’s capacity to meet both US and Australian submarine demands.
Currently, the US produces only 1.2 Virginia-class submarines per year, falling short of the projected procurement rates necessary to fulfill both countries’ requirements.
Despite significant investments by both the US Congress and the Australian government in enhancing the defense industrial base, achieving an adequate production rate remains a daunting challenge.
Should Pillar I eventually lead solely to US and UK submarines stationed closer to regional hotspots like the Taiwan Strait and the West Philippine Sea, it will still yield meaningful strategic benefits.
Conversely, Pillar II of AUKUS offers a broader array of defense industrial cooperation initiatives.
This pillar encompasses various areas, including long-range fire systems, quantum computing, unmanned underwater vehicles, electronic warfare capabilities, and artificial intelligence.
Pooling resources from all three participating countries aims to develop these advanced capabilities promptly.
While not as compelling as new nuclear submarines, these updated defensive systems are critically important, perhaps needing more focus than the submarine initiatives.
Unlike Pillar I, which deals with extensive production limitations, Pillar II stands to benefit from quick results and the potential inclusion of additional regional allies in specific projects.
One notable efficiency from Pillar II is the imminent deployment of a“trilateral algorithm” to share classified information from P-8 sonobuoys, which substantially enhances maritime domain awareness for allied anti-submarine warfare efforts.
PIPIR is another significant initiative, albeit less publicized than AUKUS.
Launched in May 2024, PIPIR encompasses a range of strategic efforts to bolster US partnerships throughout the Indo-Pacific region.
Secretary Hegseth’s recent announcements highlight a plan of action that focuses on maximizing defense capabilities while minimizing costs.
One key initiative aims to establish radar system repair capacity for the P-8 in Australia, enabling repairs closer to Asia and thus enhancing US sustainment capabilities.
The P-8 is integral to anti-submarine warfare and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, and expanding its repair abilities out of reach of most Chinese missile threats is crucial for regional security.
Another noteworthy project is aimed at defining standards for small unmanned aerial systems and developing secure supply chains for production, reducing US reliance on Chinese components in this sector.
China currently dominates the commercial drone market, which poses risks to US operational capabilities.
The Department of Defense’s innovation unit stresses that a lack of dependence on Chinese materials is vital for maintaining a credible deterrent strategy.
US Indo-Pacific Command commander Admiral Samuel Paparo has discussed the “Hellscape” concept in which the widespread utilization of unmanned systems plays a crucial role.
PIPIR’s initiatives contribute to ensuring this option exists without the encumbrance of Chinese involvement.
Additional PIPIR endeavors include enhancing ship repair capabilities in the theater and potentially collaborating with Australia on munitions production.
Co-production agreements with India on defense equipment highlight a united front in deterring aggression within the region.
The transparent announcement of PIPIR’s marquee projects has instilled confidence in regional allies and partners regarding US commitment.
Cooperation behind closed doors likely strengthens these initiatives even further in the face of shared challenges.
The alignment of PIPIR and AUKUS Pillar II is paramount for effective deterrence and defense against the growing military power of China.
Diplomatic outreach and military exercises—like Talisman Sabre—are essential for immediate deterrence but must be complemented by long-term strategies that focus on industrial capabilities.
The US Navy has recognized that China possesses 230 times more shipbuilding capacity than the United States, necessitating a united front with allies and partners to level the playing field.
Confronting China’s burgeoning defense capabilities in isolation would threaten the effectiveness of US deterrence strategies.
As President Donald Trump has previously articulated, the principle of “America first” does not translate to “America alone.”
Enhanced defense industrial cooperation can offer substantial benefits at home while ensuring that domestic jobs remain protected.
The focused review of AUKUS and PIPIR, framed within an ‘America first’ ethos, is essential to minimize risks of outsourcing US capabilities to cut costs and expedite timelines.
A revitalized approach to AUKUS and PIPIR could foster cooperative production models that empower the United States to tap into its partners’ strengths.
Collaborative efforts in areas like munitions supply, especially with regard to the critical shortage of 155mm artillery shells, will place US forces in a better position to deter and win prolonged conflicts if necessary.
As the Trump administration formulates its national security strategy aiming for US resurgence, integrating regional defense industrial collaborations should emerge as a cornerstone of restoring domestic manufacturing and enhancing US lethality and deterrence.
The early victories of AUKUS Pillar II and the announcement of PIPIR projects set the stage for an even more ambitious agenda focused on collaborative efforts in the future.
image source from：atlanticcouncil
