Last February, Russian defense companies turned heads at IDEX, the biennial arms fair in the United Arab Emirates, showcasing innovations including the Supercam S350 multipurpose drone.
Reportedly, this drone had taken down a number of Western unmanned systems on the frontline of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine following Russia’s 2022 invasion.
Historically, Russia’s presence in the Gulf defense sector has been minimal.
Gulf nations typically maintain strong defense ties with Western countries like the United States, United Kingdom, and France, driven by their security frameworks and military needs.
However, the recent visibility of Russian defense manufacturers at events like IDEX has sparked speculation about the potential for Russia to make inroads into the Arabian Peninsula’s military market.
Analysts suggest that this trend might align with geopolitical shifts, such as Washington’s diminished engagement in the region since President Donald Trump’s administration, which had aimed for a resolution to the Ukraine conflict and possibly the lifting of sanctions against Russia.
From the perspective of Gulf nations, the war in Ukraine has primarily been seen as a Western issue, with little impact on their own security dynamics.
Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE have strategically avoided following Western sanctions, adopting a stance akin to India’s, thereby allowing Russian businesses to relocate freely to Dubai to escape international pressures.
This ambiguity has even enabled Saudi Arabia to facilitate negotiations among Washington, Kyiv, and Moscow amidst the chaos.
As discussions about de-escalation persist, Gulf states may find themselves increasingly inclined to engage with Russian arms manufacturers for military supplies.
The notion of Saudi Arabia potentially procuring military equipment from Russia is not new.
The kingdom had considered purchasing the S-400 air defense system a decade ago, and in 2017, the UAE announced plans to collaborate with Russia’s Rostec on developing a joint fighter jet.
During those years, Russia enjoyed a robust reputation among the Gulf Cooperation Council leaders, who looked to it for military strategies exemplified by the hybrid approach in Crimea in 2014.
The subsequent Russian air operations in support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad were viewed as decisive actions the Gulf leaders expected from their traditional ally, the United States.
As a result, there was a perception of Russia as a strong global power capable of diversifying the Gulf’s defense procurement base away from Western suppliers.
However, aspirations of military cooperation started to fade as Riyadh never followed through on acquiring the S-400, and the joint fighter jet project with the Emirates dissipated without further developments.
Currently, the landscape is arguably less conducive to Russian defense pursuits in the Gulf than it was a decade ago.
The ongoing Ukraine conflict has substantially undermined the once-favorable perception of the Russian military.
From the Gulf’s viewpoint, the focus is not on the rationale behind Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but rather on the alarming performance of its military forces in combat.
The initial successes that Russia experienced in Crimea or during the Syrian campaign have turned sour, especially in areas such as firepower, air operations, and cybersecurity, all of which are critical to Gulf decision-makers.
By late 2022, after six months of war, Russia had reportedly depleted around 60 percent of its arsenal of precision-guided munitions.
Not only has the outcome on the battlefield been inconclusive, but the Russian military’s inability to replenish these assets indicates systemic weaknesses.
Moreover, the Russian air force, once perceived as a dominant force during the Syrian interventions, has struggled to effectively support ground offensives against Ukrainian forces.
In a report by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, it was noted that Russia has lost a significant number of its fighter jets, including at least thirty-one Sukhoi Su-34 aircraft, out of a pre-war count of 124.
While Russia’s propaganda efforts played a crucial role in swiftly securing Crimea, its recent cyber operations have demonstrated limited effectiveness due to Ukraine’s improved resilience and counter-strategies.
Additionally, the reputation of Russia’s S-400 air defense system has diminished as evidenced by Ukraine successfully neutralizing several S-400 batteries with its missile and drone assets.
In one notable instance, Ukrainian forces destroyed an S-400 battery using U.S.-manufactured ATACMS missiles that have been in service for decades.
While Russian forces have shown some adaptation to battlefield challenges, their improvements seemingly stem more from sheer numbers rather than refined tactics.
Moreover, Russia’s dependency on Iranian supplies to compensate for deficiencies in its firepower exacerbates the diminished credibility of its defense apparatus.
Russian attacks on Ukraine have, to a large extent, relied upon Iranian-made missiles and drones — a clear indication of the compromised standing of its military industry.
Considering these factors, it is increasingly improbable that Gulf states will turn towards Russia to meet their defense needs.
In addition to the fallout from apparent military shortcomings, future competitiveness of the Russian defense industry in the Gulf will be hamstrung by pressures on its supply chains.
With the Ukraine conflict dictating Moscow’s war economy, Russian defense companies have been tasked with prioritizing military needs over international outreach.
This imperative, coupled with ongoing Western sanctions, severely constrains the ability of Russian firms to produce and develop military supplies for foreign buyers.
The international landscape reflects a significant downturn in Russian arms exports over recent years.
Once a dominant player globally, Russia’s arms exports have plummeted by 64 percent in the last five years.
Take India, for example, traditionally a key market for Russian military products — its dependence on Russian imports has decreased sharply.
While Russia accounted for 55 percent of India’s arms imports from 2015 to 2019, this figure has fallen to approximately 36 percent between 2020 and 2024.
Although India continues to maintain its diplomatic stance amid the Ukraine war, it has increasingly turned to alternative suppliers such as France, Israel, and the United States for its military requirements.
The strong ties between India and Gulf states suggest that the latter are closely monitoring these shifts in the defense supply chain.
Ultimately, this dynamic highlights a significant gap between the political rhetoric of Gulf nations regarding Russia and the reality of their limited military cooperation with the country.
Despite the elevated visibility of Russian arms manufacturers at defense events like IDEX, history shows that Gulf states have consistently contemplated procurement from Moscow only to backtrack later.
This pattern is unlikely to change irrespective of developments related to negotiations over the ongoing war in Ukraine.
Jean-Loup Samaan is a senior non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Middle East Initiative and a research fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University of Singapore.
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