The ongoing conflict in the Middle East, particularly Israel’s recent 12-day war with Iran, has sparked intense debate focused on nuclear capabilities and political alliances, especially involving U.S. President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
However, amidst all these discussions, it is crucial to recognize the underlying, unsettling reality that the Islamic Republic of Iran is fundamentally driven by its resolve to eliminate both Israel and the United States, often referred to as the ‘Little Satan’ and the ‘Big Satan’, respectively.
This perspective aligns with the insights of Yehezkel Dror, an Israeli political scientist who coined the term “crazy states” back in 1971, denoting nations that engage in ideologically aggressive pursuits of irrational goals.
Dror warned that such ‘crazy martyr states,’ which are not bound by conventional deterrents, represent one of the most significant threats to global stability, especially during the Cold War era.
In contemporary discussions about international relations, Dror’s analysis is even more relevant as it highlights the Islamic Republic of Iran as an exemplar of a ‘crazy state’.
Dror’s framework identifies key characteristics that classify a state as ‘crazy’. These nations pursue ‘counter-reasonable goals’ at a substantial economic cost, often resorting to extreme measures like genocide to achieve their ambitions.
Additionally, these states exhibit a high risk tolerance, including a willingness to threaten their own existence for the sake of external objectives.
Their operational style deviates from established norms, leading to acts such as sabotage of peaceful endeavors and widespread terrorism targeting civilian institutions.
Despite having evaluated numerous nations in his work “Crazy States: A Counterconventional Strategic Problem”, Dror overlooked Iran.
If he were to revisit his book today, there is little doubt that Iran would find consideration in every chapter, given its current policy and actions that exemplify the ‘crazy state’ theory.
Dror elaborated on various misconceptions that rational states must navigate when dealing with such powers. Notably, he cited the false belief that agreements between nations are reliably honored, underscoring that ‘crazy states’ often disregard treaties.
Moreover, Dror cautioned against the ‘convex mirror effect’, which leads rational states to mistakenly view other nations through their own values and aspirations.
He also articulated that while ‘crazy states’ can act instrumentally rational to achieve their erratic goals, the instruments they choose can be perilously effective.
For instance, while rational states might pursue nuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent, Iran is unabashed about its intentions to utilize nuclear armaments against its perceived enemies.
This pursuit of nuclear capability is reminiscent of how Ayatollah Ali Khamenei observed the fate of Libyan leader Moammar Qaddafi, who was overthrown after relinquishing his nuclear arsenal.
Many within the Trump administration, possibly including President Trump himself, lean toward negotiating a deal with Iran rather than pursuing outright conflict.
However, the very act of negotiating with a ‘crazy state’ is fraught with risks, as it necessitates placing trust in a regime known for its unpredictability and history of broken promises.
In light of these complex dynamics, Dror believes that the optimal strategy toward a ‘crazy state’ like Iran is not simply containment but rather a ‘substrategy designed to incapacitate’ it.
This strategy could entail direct military action, but given the U.S. experiences in Afghanistan and Iraq, a military invasion and subsequent occupation of Iran seems implausible.
Instead, Dror advocates for policies that empower the Iranian populace, suggesting that the key to undermining the ‘crazy’ ruling regime hinges on stimulating a revolt from within.
When individuals in Iran perceive their leaders as weak or vulnerable, the likelihood of insurrection increases significantly.
Accordingly, steps taken by the U.S. to delegitimize Khamenei and expose the fragility of his power may embolden the rational elements within Iran to reclaim control from the regime that has marginalized them since 1979.
Notably, President Trump has a knack for utilizing rhetoric to challenge adversaries, and he has recently hinted at this strategic approach.
In a Truth Social post, he refrained from holding back while responding to Khamenei’s boast about Iran’s purported victory in the recent conflict, saying, ‘You got beat to hell.’
The president’s subsequent remarks sarcastically alluded to Khamenei’s supposed faith, mocking the Supreme Leader as someone who should not lie.
Trump’s ability to channel his invective into a calculated effort to diminish Khamenei’s stature among Iranians could become a formidable strategy.
If leveraged correctly, this approach could incite dissent among the Iranian populace against their own leadership.
As part of this tactic, it might be beneficial for Trump to adopt a catchy nickname for Khamenei, potentially dubbing him the ‘Hidden Imam’ to resonate with the Iranian public sentiments.
Imagining Trump further ridiculing Khamenei as the ‘Supreme Loooooser’ captures a strategy that could be effective in undermining the credibility of Iran’s leadership.
In conclusion, while the United States faces considerable challenges in engaging with Iran, the insights from Dror’s analysis on ‘crazy states’ provide a framework for understanding the dangers of the current Iranian regime and the potential paths towards fostering change from within.
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