The initial week of the Meta antitrust trial has uncovered significant insights into how the company, originally known as Facebook, recognized the competitive threat posed by Instagram during the early 2010s.
The U.S. government is alleging that Meta violated competition laws by acquiring companies like Instagram and WhatsApp, which posed a risk to Facebook’s monopoly.
Should the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) lawyers be successful, the government could mandate Meta to divest its businesses, including Instagram and WhatsApp.
In the trial proceedings, the FTC presented compelling evidence indicating that Facebook was acutely aware of Instagram’s rapid ascent and the potential risk it presented to its own platform.
Internal emails from Facebook executives reveal their concerns over Instagram’s increasing popularity, detailing discussions about acquisition costs and potential strategies to limit Instagram’s growth.
These correspondences highlight a strategic mindset at Facebook that prioritized either acquiring or suppressing potential competitors, demonstrating the cutthroat tactics that have allowed Meta to achieve its current dominance in the social media landscape.
Among the most telling excerpts from these messages reveal Mark Zuckerberg and others expressing anxiety over Instagram’s swift expansion.
In a message from February 2011, Zuckerberg flagged Instagram’s rapid user growth, stating, “Instagram seems like it’s growing quickly. In 4 months they’re up to 2m users and 30k daily photo uploads. That’s a lot. We need to track this closely.”
He also pointed out that Dropbox was planning a significant move into photo sharing, further emphasizing the competitive landscape at that time.
By September 2011, Zuckerberg underscored the urgency of addressing Instagram’s growth, warning that, “If Instagram continues to kick ass on mobile, or if Google buys them, then over the next few years they could easily add pieces of their service that copy what we’re doing now.”
Zuckerberg recognized the imperative for Facebook to react quickly, noting, “at the current rate, literally every couple of months that we waste translates to a double in their growth and a harder position for us to work our way out of.”
Comments from Chris Cox, Facebook’s chief product officer, in February 2011, illustrated a similar urgency: “The photos team is now focused almost exclusively on a new mobile photo app as we gawk at Instagram’s simple photo-sharing app taking off.”
Cox acknowledged the validation that Instagram’s success provided for Facebook’s strategy, expressing a commitment to de-cluttering its mobile experience while pursuing standalone messaging and photo products.
By February 2012, Zuckerberg’s messages intensified as he expressed concern over Instagram’s burgeoning user base.
He observed that a substantial portion of users were shifting their photo uploads to Instagram rather than Facebook, creating a “huge hole for us.”
As discussions turned toward acquisition, Zuckerberg pondered, “I wonder if we should consider buying Instagram, even if it costs ~500M. Right now they seem to have two things that we don’t: a really good camera and a photo-centric sharing network.”
Zuckerberg also reflected on the possibility that Facebook’s original assessment of the market might have been flawed, suggesting, “I think it’s quite possible that our initial thesis was wrong and theirs is right — that what people want is more to take the best photos than to put them on FB.”
He noted the strategic importance of acquiring platforms like Instagram, Path, and Pinterest, referencing a vision to integrate them into Facebook’s ecosystem by transitioning teams while preserving their products.
“By not killing their products we prevent everyone from hating us and we make sure we don’t immediately create a hole in the market for someone else to fill,
image source from：https://techcrunch.com/2025/04/19/read-what-mark-zuckerberg-and-facebook-execs-said-about-instagram-before-buying-it/
